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BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST
LAWMAKING: AUTHOR MEETS READERS,
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHRISTINE
HARRINGTON, SALLY ENGLE MERRY,
RENÉE RÖMKENS, & MARIANNE WESSON*
PANELISTS
Author
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER** is the Rose L. Hoffer
Professor of Law and Chair of the Edward V. Sparer Public
Interest Law Fellowship Program at Brooklyn Law School. She
is the author of Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (Yale
University Press 2000), which won the 2000 Professional/
Scholarly Publishing Award of the Association of American
Publishers, Legal Category. She is the coauthor of the law school
* This article is a transcribed version of the Author Meets Readers panel
discussion of Elizabeth M. Schneider’s book, Battered Women and Feminist
Lawmaking, at the 2001 International Law and Society Conference in
Budapest, Hungary on July 6, 2001. Both the readers who participated in the
formal program and audience members who participated in the informal
discussion and who were known to the panelists because of their work on
issues of domestic violence are identified by name. Other audience members
who participated in the informal discussion are not identified by name because
they were not known to the panelists.
** Thanks to Christine Harrington for chairing and organizing this panel,
to Sally Merry, Renée Römkens, Mimi Wesson, Isabel Marcus, Elizabeth
Rapaport and Betsy Stanko for participating in the program and for their
generosity in helping to put the panel transcript together in publishable form.
Special thanks go to Caroline Nadal, Audrey Woo, Angela Calcagno and the
staff of the Journal of Law and Policy for their extraordinary commitment and
superb work in putting this article together.
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casebook, Battered Women and the Law (Foundation Press 2001)
(with Clare Dalton), and has published many articles on gender,
law, civil rights, and civil procedure. She has also been a
Visiting Professor at Harvard and Columbia Law Schools. Before
becoming a law teacher, she clerked for District Judge Constance
Baker Motley in the Southern District of New York, and was a
staff attorney at the Center for Constitutional Rights in NYC, and
the Constitutional Litigation Clinic at Rutgers Law SchoolNewark, where she litigated many landmark cases and did
pioneering work on women’s rights. A graduate of Bryn Mawr
College, she has an M.Sc. from The London School of
Economics and a J.D. from New York University Law School.
Chair of Panel
CHRISTINE HARRINGTON is Associate Professor of Politics
at New York University, and founding Director of the Institute
for Law and Society and the Law and Society Program. Her
research interests are in the areas of public law and law and
society. She has published in Law & Society Review, Law &
Policy and other journals on dispute processing (mediation and
regulatory negotiation) and litigation (federal regulatory and
federal appellate civil) as forms of political participation and sites
of ideological production. Her book, Lawyers in a Postmodern
World: Translation and Transgression (New York University
Press 1994), examines the role of lawyers and professional power
in American political development and state formation, as does
Administrative Law and Politics (Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.
2000). Professor Harrington is currently researching and writing
about the cultural politics of rights as they materialize in global
preservation movements, indigenous entitlement and reparation
claims in an article entitled Untouchable Entitlement
(forthcoming).
Readers
SALLY ENGLE MERRY is Professor of Anthropology at
Wellesley College and Co-director of the Peace and Justice
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Studies Program. Her work in the anthropology of law focuses
on law and culture, law and colonialism, and the legal
construction of race. She has written Colonizing Hawai’i: The
Cultural Power of Law (Princeton University Press 2000), The
Possibility of Popular Justice: A Case Study of American
Community Mediation (co-edited with Neal Milner, University of
Michigan Press 1993), Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal
Consciousness Among Working Class Americans (University of
Chicago Press 1990), and Urban Danger: Life in a Neighborhood
of Strangers (Temple University Press 1981). She is currently
studying the regulation of violence against women within the
international human rights system, analyzing it as an example of
an emergent global legal order. She is past-President of the Law
and Society Association and the Association for Political and
Legal Anthropology.
RENÉE RÖMKENS is a criminologist who is Visiting Professor
in the Institute for Research on Women and Gender at Columbia
University and Associate Professor in the Department of General
Social Sciences at Utrecht University in the Netherlands. She also
holds a Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of Amsterdam.
She has a long record of research in the field of domestic
violence, including the first national survey in Western Europe
(Netherlands), which she conducted in the late 1980s on
prevalence, social risk markers and psychological consequences
of violence against women. Her recent research in the United
States is in the socio-legal domain and focuses on how the powers
of law operate in a criminal justice system that increasingly
cooperates with other disciplines.
MARIANNE WESSON is Professor of Law, Wolf-Nichol
Fellow, and President’s Teaching Scholar at University of
Colorado. She has published articles about domestic violence, the
pornography debate, and criminal law and procedure. In addition
to her academic work, she provides regular legal commentary for
National Public Radio’s Weekend Edition Sunday and has written
two novels, Render Up the Body (Harper Mass Market
Paperbacks 1998) and A Suggestion of Death (Pocket Books
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2000). Professor Wesson received her J.D. from the University
of Texas School of Law. She served as law clerk to Judge
William Wayne Justice of the Eastern District of Texas as well as
Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Colorado.
AUDIENCE MEMBERS / DISCUSSION PARTICIPANTS
ISABEL MARCUS is Director of the Institute for Research and
Education on Women and Gender and Chair of Women’s Studies
at the University of Buffalo, and Professor of Law at University
of Buffalo School of Law. She holds a Ph.D. in political science
and a J.D. from the University of California-Berkeley. Her
writing has focused on women’s issues, most recently on
domestic violence. She has traveled and lectured extensively in
Eastern Europe, including Lithuania and Poland, as well as the
People’s Republic of China, India, and Pakistan. In 1997, she
was a Fulbright Lecturer on the Faculty of Law at Babes-Bolyai
University, Cluj, Romania. She has written a book, Dollars for
Reform: The OEO Neighborhood Health Centers (Lexington
Books 1981), and is working on a second, Dark Numbers: The
Emergence of Domestic Violence as a Law and Public Policy
Issue in Eastern Europe and Russia.
ELIZABETH RAPAPORT is the Dickason Professor of Law at
University of New Mexico School of Law. She teaches criminal
law, criminal procedure, and jurisprudence. Her scholarship
reflects a longstanding interest in women in the criminal justice
system and a more recent interest in executive clemency. She is
currently at work on a book tentatively entitled Capital
Punishment and the Domestic Discount: Gender, Family and the
Death Penalty. Professor Rapaport received her J.D. from
Harvard Law School and her Ph.D. from Case Western Reserve
University. She taught philosophy at Boston University for ten
years before attending law school.
BETSY STANKO is Director of ESRC Violence Research
Programme and Professor of Criminology in the Department of
Social and Political Science, Royal Holloway, University of
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London. She is the author of over sixty papers and books
exploring gender and violence and decision-making of public
officials. Most notable of these are Intimate Intrusions (Routledge
1985) and Everyday Violence (Pandora Press 1990). She has
studied police and policing since the mid 1970s. Her most recent
research on domestic violence, an area in which she has been
both an activist and a researcher for twenty-five years, includes
Counting the Costs: Estimating the Impact of Domestic Violence
in the London Borough of Hackney (1998) and Domestic Violence
and Social Housing: Southwark (2000). Last autumn, she
conducted the first day count on incidents of domestic violence
known to police in the U.K. In January 2002, she joined the
Office of Public Services Reform, Cabinet Office, as a Principal
Advisor. She is also currently the project leader of Responding
and Understanding Hate Crime, a study examining the use of
routine information about the Hate Crime for the Metropolitan
Police. Funded by the Home Office, this project is the first of its
kind in the U.K. and is located inside the Metropolitan Police’s
Diversity Unit.
DISCUSSION
Christine Harrington
We are here today to discuss Liz Schneider’s book Battered
Women and Feminist Lawmaking1 and the issues this book raises
1

ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING (Yale University Press 2000). The book examines the
pathbreaking legal process that has brought the pervasiveness and severity of
domestic violence to public attention and has led the United States Congress,
the Supreme Court, and the United Nations to address the problem over the
last thirty years. Schneider explores how claims of rights for battered women
have emerged from feminist activism, and assesses the possibilities and
limitations of feminist legal advocacy to improve battered women’s lives and
transform law and culture. The book chronicles the struggle to incorporate
feminist arguments into law, particularly in cases of battered women who kill
their assailants and battered women who are mothers. With a broad
perspective on feminist lawmaking as a vehicle of social change, Schneider
examines a range of subjects including criminal prosecution of batterers, the
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for law and society scholars.2 I will first sketch out two important
themes in the book and then moderate the discussion among our
panelists and with the audience. Our panelists are Professor Sally
Merry, who teaches anthropology at Wellesley College,
Professor Marianne (“Mimi”) Wesson, who is at the University
of Colorado Law School, and Professor Renée Römkens,
Visiting Professor at Columbia University and Professor at
Utrecht University in the Netherlands. The author of the book is
Professor Liz Schneider from Brooklyn Law School. Professor

civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, the O.J.
Simpson trials, and a class on battered women and the law that she taught at
Harvard Law School. Feminist lawmaking on woman abuse, Schneider
argues, should reaffirm the historic vision of violence and gender equality that
originally animated activist and legal work.
For reviews of Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking, see, e.g.,
Katherine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse: Battered Women and
Feminist Lawmaking, 110 YALE L.J. 1459 (2001) (book review); Suzanne J.
Groisser, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 385 (2001) (book review); Sally J. Scholz, Battered Women & Feminist
Lawmaking, 7 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 10 (2001) (book review);
Marianne Wesson, 18 WOMEN’S REVIEW OF BOOKS 23 (2000) (book review);
Liza Featherstone, Book World: Getting Even, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2000, at
X10; Peter Glick, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
14, 2000, at 2; Julie Goldscheid & Mary McGowan Davis, Beyond
Victimization: New Approaches to Gender Violence and Law Reform, Battered
Women & Feminist Lawmaking, at http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/lawbooks/
revmar01.htm (book review); Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, Battered Women &
Feminist Lawmaking, 11 LAW & POLITICS BOOK REV. 80, 80-82 (Feb. 2002),
at http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/lpbr/subpages/reviews/schneider.htm (book
review). See also Recent Publications, Battered Women and Feminist
Lawmaking, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1829 (2001); Book Notes, 26 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 296, 296 (2001); Symposium, Confronting Domestic Violence and
Achieving Gender Equality: Evaluating Battered Women and Feminist
Lawmaking, AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. (forthcoming).
2
Law and society scholars examine the function of law in society and the
symbiosis between law and society. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and
Society Movement, 38 STAN L. REV. 763, 775 (1986). The Law and Society
Association was founded in 1964 and publishes the Law and Society Review.
See The Law and Society Association, at http://www.lawandsociety.org. Its
members are comprised of scholars in the areas of law, sociology, political
science, anthropology, economics, and history. Id.
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Schneider will have an opportunity to make some remarks about
her book, then we will hear from each panelist. Finally, we will
open the discussion up to the audience.
It is hard to be systematic in my comments because I have
been engaged with Liz’s argument about the dialectic between
rights and politics from the time she first introduced dialectics as
a feminist methodology and as a feminist epistemology for legal
reform.3 This argument has made a profound feminist
contribution to research areas in law and society, such as law and
social policy, law and social change, and feminist legal theory. In
the beginning of the book, Liz says, “I examine both the
accomplishments and contradictions through the lens of feminist
legal advocacy efforts on violence against women in the United
States.”4 Her theoretical approach is not concerned with
measuring the successes or failures of the movement. She does
something more methodologically sophisticated than “gap
studies,” which repeatedly (and inevitably) find that there is a
“gap” between reform ideas and implementation of policy.5 The
book examines the interrelationship between law and social
movement practices in order to understand a larger problem for
law and social policy—the interrelationship between rights and
politics viewed in terms of the dialectic between consciousness
and social change. In the case of the U.S. movement against
domestic violence, Liz employs dialectics to deconstruct familiar
categories in law and in society (e.g., public/private;
male/female; civil/criminal; mother/child; husband/wife; etc.).
She argues that these binary categories are themselves the focus
of consciousness raising in the feminist movement and in feminist
lawyering. In so doing, the book systematically unravels the
complexity of lawmaking for feminist lawyers. She writes,
“lawmaking and rights assertions can be understood as forms of
3

See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics:
Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
4
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 5.
5
See CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (Greenwood Publ’g
Group 1985) (examining the legal formalism that results in a gap between
socio-legal reform ideology and institutional practice).
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the philosophical concept of praxis.”6 If consciousness-raising is
itself a form of praxis, then the work of transcending gendered
social and legal dichotomies, such as those to which I just
referred, may in turn explain how new and perhaps even more
emancipatory social practices for women are forged in intimate,
as well as state relationships. While her analysis gives particular
weight to “historical contingency” as a key factor in shaping the
politics of rights, the dialectical method she employs makes a
compelling argument that “rights” and “politics” are best
understood as praxis.
The book examines over thirty years of work on social
constructions of “violence against women”—social constructions
produced by the state, by feminist scholars, by lawyers, by
battered women and children, by the courts and by other social
forces like economics, psychology, politics, etc.7 The book
synthesizes disparate bodies of research from an array of
disciplines on how and why particular social constructions of
domestic violence dominate at particular periods in U.S. history.
This aspect of the book makes another important contribution to
law and society work. For here, in the deconstruction of
gendered battery, Liz carves out new social space, new social
understanding of law, for the survivors of domestic violence. I
am referring to the survivors who did not have advocates, the
survivors who did not have feminist lawyers, the survivors
Professor Linda Gordon writes about in Heroes of Their Own
Lives.8 The interdisciplinary approach Liz develops makes better

6

SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 34 (citing Karl E. Klare, Lawmaking As
Praxis, 40 TELOS 123, 132 n.28 (1979)); Schneider, supra note 3, at 600
(explaining that “[t]he fundamental aspect of praxis is the active role of
consciousness and subjectivity in shaping theory and practice, and the dynamic
interrelationship that results . . . . [L]awmaking can be a form of praxis; it can
be constitutive, creative, and an expression of the ‘embeddedness of action-inbelief and belief-in-action.’”) (quoting Klare, supra at 132 n.28).
7
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 13-28; see also infra note 25 (regarding
the ever-expanding and unstable definition of violence against women).
8
LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 250-88 (Viking Penguin 1988) (delineating the
gender-based causes of spouse abuse, describing difficulties of mothers in
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sense of law and social policy for those of us who have survived
domestic violence in the pre-1970s period—for those of us who
have our stories recorded in police records as “family
disturbances” or “family quarrels.” The approach provides a way
to understand more fully how these social constructions operated
in law and society and in women’s lives.9 While the book may
make sense for/to survivors of domestic violence, it does not
portray them as heroic or super human. To do so would embrace
an individualist explanation of domestic violence and lend
support to volitional policies. Instead, Liz’s analysis suggests that
the survivors are representative of a human condition that moves
them and us to struggle for emancipation. That condition, that
vision of emancipation, is made present in how Liz writes about
the detailed practices of feminist lawyering in which she is
implicated.
With these two contributions in mind, one more classically
academic—her analysis of the dialectic of rights and politics—
and the other more general—her view of what motivates social
change—I turn to Liz for her introductory comments.
Liz Schneider
Let me provide some background. The book comes out of
thirty years of my work in a variety of different contexts: as a
lawyer, as an activist, as a theorist, and as a law teacher. In the
book I offer a critical perspective on the last thirty years of
feminist legal advocacy, in which I have been involved both as a
lawyer and as a theorist. The link between theory and practice
has been something that has been very much a part of my life and
my own work, my approach to law, my teaching. The book not
procuring relief from abuse, and examining the pattern of battered women’s
resistance from 1880 to 1960).
9
Id. at 278, 285-86, 294 (showing that wife beating has been sanctioned
and controlled throughout history by cultural influences such as religion, law,
family and friends, evidenced by a history of female subordination and
passivity, the reluctance of the state through legal means to interfere with
family privacy, and the protection sought in the refuge of supportive family
members’ homes).
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only talks about activism and experience in a number of different
areas of lawmaking, but it talks about the process of change. For
example, in addition to problems of litigation and lawyering, I
discuss the importance of bringing some of these insights and
perspectives around domestic violence into law schools and other
academic fields, and the difficulty in teaching issues of domestic
violence.10
The book is intended to be a kind of insider self-critical
reflection—critical in raising hard questions for those of us who
have been involved in this work, struggling with these questions
more broadly. Since I know there are many of you in the room
who have not read the book, the most important theme is that
while domestic violence has been recognized as a more serious
public problem, public thinking and legal work around domestic
violence have become decontextualized from issues of gender.
The notion of gender is what originally shaped activism and law
reform on domestic violence—it is the way in which activists
framed it. Domestic violence was a moment, a part of a broader
problem of gender inequality. But now domestic violence has
become unmoored from those issues of gender, for a whole
variety of reasons, which I develop in the book.11 The book
argues that it is necessary to reaffirm the original impetus of
activism and advocacy on domestic violence, the inextricable link
10

See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 105-11, 211-12, 223-27.
See id. at 6, 21-28, 96-97, 101-11, 182-88, 228-32. Traditionally,
feminists have argued that systemic societal female subordination produces
gender violence. Id. at 5, 22-23, 228. Feminists who began the battered
women’s movement, many of whom were themselves battered, viewed
battered women as sisters in the larger struggle towards gender equality. Id. at
22-23, 96. They worked not only to alleviate the threat of violence, but also to
address social and economic disparities that subordinate women and make
them susceptible to gender-motivated violence. Id. at 22-23, 96. As the
movement has gained legitimacy, Schneider argues that the link between
battering and gender bias has become increasingly subverted and that
lawmakers approach violence against women as if it can be solved in isolation
from its historical and social contexts. Id. at 6, 27-28. Broader issues of
gender such as socialization, lack of education, child care, employment
discrimination, and poverty are frequently excluded from consideration in
legal reform concerning domestic violence. Id. at 23-26, 183, 229-30.
11
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between violence and equality.
Sally Merry
I was delighted to have a chance to read and comment on this
book. Liz Schneider has provided us an invaluable overview of
the key elements of feminist legal thinking about battered
women. The book is well-grounded in past struggles,12 so there is
a clear sense of development and change in the field. It is also
rooted in feminist analysis,13 resisting the increasingly pervasive
psychological and family systems models, which are coming to
12

SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 15-23, 39, 42-45, 88-97. Schneider notes
that domestic violence has been part of practically every culture throughout
history. Id. at 13. For example, Anglo-American common law and early
Roman law provided that a husband could treat his wife as property, and it
was his prerogative to chastise her. Id. at 13.
An initial wave of advocacy in the United States during the nineteenth
century achieved measured success by focusing primarily on domestic violence
instead of attacking male dominance generally or asserting the woman’s
inherent right to freedom and equality. Id. at 16, 18, 43. However,
achievements did not translate into real progress, as the movement’s initial
success in prohibiting public violence against women could not protect
violence against women in the marital context, which courts felt was beyond
their capacity to adjudicate. Id. at 17-18, 88-97. For example, family court
judges often failed to provide a battered woman with physical protection if she
filed a complaint against her batterer, asserting that family preservation was
necessary and the abuse could be cured or corrected. Id. at 18.
The second wave of advocacy during the twentieth century was premised
on the notion of a woman’s inherent right to be free from violence and led to
the development of social services and increased social and economic
opportunities for women. Id. at 21-22, 39, 42-43. Domestic violence survivors
still struggle within a social framework of gender inequality, leading to their
economic dependence on the batterer, the absence of social support networks
to aid in mothering, lack of educational opportunities, lack of child care and,
in general, their social and economic vulnerability. Id. at 12-13, 23.
13
Schneider’s feminist analysis encompasses not only gender-based
descriptions explicitly linking gender, violence and women’s equality, but also
broad descriptions of battering that explore interrelationships between
coercion, power and control, and political descriptions of battering using
statist imagery (such as terrorism and torture) to detail the experience of
battering. Id. at 46-49.
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dominate this field. One of its values is its commitment to this
feminist approach, an approach to a large extent on the defensive
in the U.S. today. I also appreciated the book because it is
grounded in legal questions. What are the evidentiary difficulties
of these cases? What are the preconceptions of judges? What are
the biases in the way the categories of law privilege men’s
experiences? There is clearly a sense of looking back in this
book, of assessing the past thirty years of this movement and
confronting some of its ironies and the areas of resistance it has
encountered.
Schneider recognizes that despite major advances in the
battered women’s movement,14 there is still a great deal of
resistance and some indication that resistance is increasing. The
story is one of good intentions and good interventions poorly
carried out by police, judges and legal officials who are often too
ambivalent about prosecuting men who are violent with their
partners. The public/private divide that relegated this problem to
the bedroom rather than the courtroom seems to have remained
intractable, relatively unchanged despite enormous pressure to
change.15
I found the situation of the defense of women who kill their
batterers among the most important ironies in the book. It seems
to me that this problem more than any other engaged feminist
legal scholars in the early part of the movement. But this problem
led to a very productive reexamination of the concept of selfdefense, the way it was applied to women rather than men, and

14

Schneider argues that the development of a battered women’s
movement has advanced and improved women’s self-determination, selforganization, and democratic participation as citizens. Id. at 20-27.
15
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (exemplifying
judicial reluctance to encroach on the marital bedroom); Soto v. Flores, 103
F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 819 (1997) (affirming the
dismissal of an abused woman’s § 1983 suit against local police, who refused
to arrest her abusive husband days before he killed himself and her children,
and holding that the woman had not been deprived of her constitutional right
to due process and that no constitutional duty exists for police to protect
citizens from private violence). See generally Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of
Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).
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the nature of male identity presumed by reasonable man
concepts.16 The irony lies in the development of the explanatory
framework of “battered women syndrome.” As Schneider shows
well, this particular framework has reinforced images of battered
women as passive, helpless victims.17 I think it was so successful
precisely because it was so compatible with existing gender
ideologies. Much as the right to abortion founded on privacy
arguments has served to reinforce the domain of the family as
private,18 this argument reinforced images of women’s passivity,
even as it may have succeeded in freeing the women who killed
their batterers.
Schneider also asks about the implications of using a rights
approach for this problem.19 This is a key question, both for the
United States movement, which began with some ambivalence
about rights, and for the international violence against women
movement. As she points out, early activists recognized the
problem of using rights, but they had to rely on the law as a way
to define the problem and intervene in it.20 As the global
16

Gender bias has long plagued the application of self-defense laws to
battered women who kill; judges and attorneys tended to categorize these
women as “mentally ill” or “temporarily insane” rather than to view their
actions as taken in self defense and to apply a reasonableness standard. See
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 79-83, 113-15, 121-22. The traditional doctrine
of self-defense was based on the experience of men and did not account for
women’s different perceptions. Feminist legal scholars have attempted to
introduce evidence to help juries understand that women who kill their
batterers may act in reasonable and justifiable self-defense. Id. at 121-26.
17
Id. at 62. Schneider argues further that defining battered women as
helpless victims is also dangerous because it revives the concept of excuse by
“focus[ing] on the woman’s defects, the woman as subject to the ‘syndrome,’”
thus implying the woman is “inherently deficient instead of affirming the
circumstances of her act.” Id. at 135. The term “battered woman syndrome”
triggers stereotypes for lawyers and judges and plays into the patriarchal
attitudes of courts. Id. at 137. Consequently, the term “battered woman
survivor” has begun to be used instead of “victim.” Id. at 76.
18
See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
19
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 34-45 (discussing the development and
shortcomings of the rights approach to feminist lawmaking).
20
Id. at 38-45.
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movement expands in the wake of the Vienna Conference of
199321 and the Beijing Conference of 1995,22 a rights approach is
21

The World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria, 1993,
addressed a broad spectrum of human rights activities and specifically
addressed women’s human rights issues. Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, World Conference on Human Rights (June
1993), at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wchr.htm. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action provided in part that the equal participation
of women in all aspects of life and the elimination of sexual discrimination
were priorities of the international community. Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, U.N. Commission on Women, 39th Sess., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.6/1995/5/Add.7 (1995), available at http://www.un.org/esa/gopherdata/esc/cn6/1995/1995-5.en7. The declaration specifically called for the
appointment of a Special Rapporteur on violence against women and for the
drafting of a declaration eliminating violence against women. Hanna Roberts,
The Human Rights of Women in the United Nations: Developments 1993-1994,
available at http://www.amnesty.se/women/23ae.htm. In late 1993, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women, which defines violence against women broadly to
include physical, sexual, and psychological harm and calls for member states
to eliminate violence against women through preventive, investigative, and
punishing measures. Id. In 1994, the United Nations appointed the first
Special Rapporteur, Radhika Coomaraswamy, who collects information
relating to violence against women, recommends remedial measures, and
works with other critical members of the Commission on Human Rights. See
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 53; United Nations Department of Public
Information, Women and Violence (1996), at http://www.un.org.rights/dpi
1772e.htm.
22
The United Nations held its Fourth World Conference on Women in
Beijing in September 1995, during which officials drafted the Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action. The declaration acknowledged the
advancement of the status of women, but, noting persisting gender
inequalities, called for governments worldwide to take positive steps to ensure
peace for the advancement of women, to promote women’s economic
independence, and to eliminate all forms of discrimination. “Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on Women”
U.N. Doc A/Conf. 177/20 (1995). For more detailed discussion, see Elizabeth
L. Larson, United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for
Equality, Development, and Peace (Beijing, China: September 1995), 10
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 695 (1996); Margaret Plattner, The Status of Women
Under International Human Rights Law and the 1995 UN World Conference
on Women, Beijing, China, 84 KY. L.J. 1249 (1996). One hundred eightynine governments adopted the Platform for Action, including the United
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becoming increasingly central. Yet, it is contested in many of the
same ways that rights are ambivalent and contested in the U.S. A
fundamental theme that arises throughout this book is the
discussion about individual or collective rights, how these rights
are to be defined, and whether rights can be maintained in a more
collective sense.23
I want to emphasize three major points from the book that I
found valuable, although there were many others. The first is the
difficulty of defining the problem itself. There are so many
labels, with so many different implications. The term “battered
woman” itself is one among many, and Liz talks about which
term to use.24 Does this mean woman as victim? Does this ignore
attention to the perpetrator? What is the meaning of genderneutral terms like “spouse assault”? I think defining the problem
is critical because the solution depends on how the problem is
defined. If the problem is defined as “patriarchy,” there is one
set of solutions; if defined as “spouse assault,” solutions depend
on family functioning. I think that this book, which begins by
foregrounding that problem, is very important. Much of the
struggle in the movement has actually been to create a stable
definition.25 I think a definition is elusive because so much is at
States, and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported that
women’s lives had improved as a result. See Press Release, United Nations,
Secretary-General in Address to Women’s International Forum Says Shaping
UN’s Future in New Century “Vital Exercise” (Jan. 14, 2000). In June 2000,
the United Nations held a Special Session to reaffirm member states’ 1995
commitments and held panel discussions examining the role of men and boys
in ending gender-based violence, on promoting dialogue between government
and non-government organizations, and on mainstreaming gender perspectives
in peacekeeping operations. See Special Session of the General Assembly,
Beijing + 5, Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the
Twenty-First Century (2000), at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/
followup/beijing+5.htm.
23
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 62-65, 103.
24
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 45, 60-62.
25
There has been wide variety in the definition of “domestic violence.”
See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 1994) (defining domestic violence as
abuse of a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, dating
partner, fiancée, person with whom the abuser has a child, child of the abuser,
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stake—whether this is a movement against institutions that
reinforce male power and the family, or whether this is a
movement about psychologically dysfunctional men or women.
The continuing definitional instability is symptomatic of the
importance of the problem. And because the definition of a
problem inexorably points to the solution and the particular mode
of intervention, the difficulty of defining the problem leads to
complexity in the kinds of responses and solutions that we are
seeing on the ground, which vary between psychotherapeutic
approaches to much more culturally transformative ones that may
begin to address problems of patriarchy. Batterer intervention
programs for men provide an interesting example. Here we see
the tension between the individual and the collective
understanding of rights. Is battering defined as an individual
violation of rights or as a violation of a collective body of
individuals such as women, whose rights are being systematically
denied?
This problem appears in the human rights international level
as well. One of the interesting issues on the international level is
the wide variation in the definition of the problem in different
national and sub-group contexts. This is related to differences in
the way the problem is conceptualized based on different kinship

or other person related by consanguinity or affinity); John M. Burman,
Lawyers and Domestic Violence: Part I, 24 WYO. LAWYER 36, 38 (2001)
(defining domestic violence as “a pattern of coercive behavior . . . perpetrated
by who was or is in an intimate relationship with the victim”); see also Health
Resource Center on Domestic Violence/Family Violence Prevention Fund,
Health Care Responses to Domestic Violence Fact Sheet, available at
http://endabuse.org/programs/display.php3?DocID=25 (describing domestic
violence as a pattern of coercive and assaultive behaviors, such as physical,
psychological or sexual attacks, or economic coercion used by individuals
against their partners); National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, What is
Battering?, available at http://ncadv.org/problem/what.htm (asserting that
battering is a pattern of behavior employed to exert power and control over
another individual via fear and intimidation); New York State Office for the
Prevention of Domestic Violence, A Power and Control Perspective, available
at http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/about_dv/wheeltext.html (explaining how
domestic violence entails a range of behaviors with maintenance of power and
control as the goal).
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systems and different ideologies about how societies are
organized. For example, I just spent a little time in China
interviewing practitioners and scholars working on the problem
of violence against women. Although the Chinese take inspiration
from Seoul,26 Beijing27 and the U.S. movement,28 the concern, at
least in some of the literature I read, is that the problem needs to
be defined differently in the context of the Chinese kinship
system.29 One argument is that the U.S. model, which is also the
European model, tends to focus on sexual relationships across a
26

South Korea has addressed problems of domestic violence through
family law reform. The government first recognized decades of work by
women’s rights advocates by enacting major family law revisions in January
1991, which somewhat improved women’s rights in the areas of marriage,
divorce, child custody, and property inheritance. See Rosa Kim, The Legacy
of Institutionalized Gender Inequality in South Korea: The Family Law, 14
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 145, 149-53 (1994). See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 1999
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Feb. 25, 2000), available at http://www.state.gov/
www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/southkor.html; Erin Cho, Caught
in Confucius’ Shadow: The Struggle for Women’s Legal Equality in South
Korea, 12 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 125 (1998) (tracing the evolution of Korea’s
family law revision movement).
27
See supra note 22 (describing the 1995 Beijing Conference).
28
The United States addresses problems of domestic violence using a
legal rights and legislative approach. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 34-54;
compare the battered women’s movement in Great Britain, infra notes 71-72
and accompanying text. See also infra note 64 (describing the Violence
Against Women Act).
29
The Chinese kinship system is centered on the Confucian belief that
emphasizes the importance of a societal “moral order expressed through the
five cardinal relationships.” William P. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental?
Implications of Roberto Unger’s Uses and Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64
TEX. L. REV. 915, 941 (1986). These five cardinal relationships are “those
between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and
younger brother, and older and younger friend,” Id. at n.205. Many Chinese
traditions, including certain aspects of its legal system, are rooted in the
traditional Chinese kinship system. Janice A. Lee, Note, Family Law of the
Two Chinas: A Comparative Look at the Rights of Married Women in the
People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China, 5 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 217, 219 (1997).
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wide
variety
of
settings—relationships
such
as
boyfriend/girlfriend, husband/wife, same-sex partners, and
various romantic relationships—whereas in China, the grounding
is in the kinship system, but the victim can be the wife, the infant
girl, or the old father or mother.30 There is a different array and
structure of kin that can be part of these battered relationships,
given the nature of the patrilineal, patrilocal family structure.
This kind of instability at the heart of the problem is an
interesting issue to consider as the definition of the problem
crosses national boundaries.
The second point in the book that I thought was very
instructive and interesting is the difficulty of lawyering in this
field—the really painful dilemmas and dichotomies for feminist
lawyers trying to use the courts. Especially trenchant is the
analysis of the struggle to move past the dichotomy between
victims and agents. Again, the explanatory framework of
“battered women’s syndrome” exacerbated this problem by
creating women as deserving protection only if they are defined
as victims. This dichotomy exists despite efforts to redefine
women as survivors, which I have found in my own research is
clearly the preferred term.31
I was thinking about this in light of David Garland’s recent
book called The Culture of Control32 in which he talks about the
shift in criminal justice theory that took place in the 1970s in the
United States from a focus on protecting the defendant and the
defendant’s rights to a focus on defending the victim and
prosecuting the perpetrator. This shift has led to longer and

30

See Yuhong Zhao, Domestic Violence in China: In Search of Legal and
Social Responses, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 211, 218-19 (2001) (advocating
a broader definition for the term “domestic violence” in China to include other
family members such as children and grandchildren). See generally Paula C.
Littlewood, Domestic Child Abuse Under the U.N. Convention on the Rights
of the Child: Implications for Children’s Rights in Four Asian Countries, 6
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 411, 426-431 (commenting on the state of child abuse
in China).
31
See, e.g., SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 61, 76.
32
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (Univ. of Chi. Press 2001).
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longer periods of incarceration, more severe punishments, and
more punitive attitudes towards defendants; yet the transition was
partly engineered by a focus on the victim, who became much
more central to our theorizing in the late twentieth century than
he or she had been before. Ironically, the success of the feminist
movement in foregrounding the victim has, in fact, contributed in
some ways to this more punitive, less rehabilitative approach
towards offenders of all sorts, not just batterers. I think this is
one of the painful dilemmas of trying to do lawmaking in this
domain. Indeed, as Schneider points out, it is only as victims that
women get help in court, and even within that framework, their
inability to be heard is severely circumscribed.33 At the same
time, by emphasizing the image of this vulnerable, undeserving
victim, the battered women’s movement itself may have
contributed to the refocus of the criminal justice system.34 This is
clearly one of those ironies of social transformation.
A second unintended and undesired consequence of the
criminalization of battering has been the continued legal
surveillance and incarceration of men of color. In my research, it
turned out that the vast disproportion of men who end up in
batterer’s treatment programs are poor and men of color.35 These
are not, of course, the only men who batter, but they are the ones
who end up in the criminal justice system. And, as Angela Davis
asked at the first Color of Violence Conference last year, is the

33

SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 186 (explaining arguments that mandatory
prosecution and no-drop policies can “re-victimize women by subjecting them
to further coercion at the hands of the state; they increase the risk of
retaliation against the victim by the batterer; and finally, they disempower
women by taking their autonomy away from them”).
34
See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 74-86 (regarding the issues relevant to
victimization of women in feminist lawmaking and arguing that gender
subordination should be understood as a process in which women can both be
oppressed and offer resistance simultaneously). See also id. at 186 (regarding
arguments of those who believe that “shifting the decision to prosecute from
the victim to the state disempowers batterers and prevents them from further
manipulating justice and endangering victims’ lives”).
35
Sally Engle Merry, Gender Violence and Legally Engendered Selves, 2
IDENTITIES: GLOBAL STUDIES IN CULTURE AND POWER 49 (1995).
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criminal justice system the only way to go?36 Did white feminists
who pursued this route really think about the dilemmas for
women of color, whose partners have already been
disproportionally subject to police and judicial surveillance?
Schneider notes that this was early recognized as a problem in the
feminist movement,37 and yet, it is one of those painful dilemmas
that is hard to escape. In my more cynical moments, I wonder if
the success of the battered women’s movement in bringing these
cases to court and achieving at least minimal standards for arrest,
prosecution, and even occasional incarceration is in part because
it dovetailed with these other agendas, both the refocus on
victims and the increase of control and surveillance over men of
color. I am not making any claims about intentionality. I am only
saying that this convergence of conservative and feminist
interests may have facilitated feminist successes, although not in
a way advocated or desired by feminists.
Although the whole book is very strong, one of the strongest
chapters discusses the dilemmas of motherhood and battering.38 It
has long been clear to me that there is an image of a good victim
as one who calls the police, who prosecutes the case, who
testifies, and who leaves. But it seems clear that there is also an
image of a good mother, and this is a similarly constrained
identity. Only if one behaves a certain way does one really merit
the support of the criminal justice system. The good mother is the
person who immediately leaves the partner, protects her children
at all costs, puts the interests of her children before her own, and
is the person who deserves help, not the others.39 It is a very
constraining identity. I thought that this analysis was really
fascinating and full of painful dilemmas for lawyering in this
sphere of work.
36

Angela Davis, Keynote Address at The Color of Violence: Violence
Against Women of Color (Oct. 25, 2000), in 3 COLORLINES, Fall 2000,
available at http://csf.colorado.edu/soc/m-fem/2000/msg01004.htm.
37
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 63-64, 184, 196.
38
Id. at 148-78.
39
See, e.g., id.; LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES 252-64
(Viking 1988) (describing certain traits of mothers that are detrimental to
receiving social agency relief).
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The third point I wanted to discuss is the implication of the
growing international human rights movement against violence
against women. I agree with Liz that the international movement
has very significantly re-politicized the problem, taken it back out
of the domain of psychological definitions of individual
malfunction—the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”)
discussions—and moved it to a new, more political domain.40
Schneider makes this point clear, and I think it is a critical one. It
is interesting that in the international debates, the definition of
violence against women has become increasingly expansive. It
now includes trafficking, rape in wartime, violence against
women in refugee camps, the effects of poverty, armed conflict,
globalization, and structural adjustment programs.41
People talked about this very issue at the Beijing Plus Five
Conference42 and have talked about it at other international
meetings. I heard one woman from Nigeria ask at Beijing Plus
Five, “Can you consider polygamy violence against women?”
This was in a non-government organization (“NGO”) discussion
about violence against women. The organizer said, “Sure, why
40

SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 28, 53-56. See generally Rhonda
Copelon, Bringing Beijing Home, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 599 (1996) (quoting
the Beijing Declaration that “women’s rights are human rights”); Berta
Esperanza
Hernandez-Tryol,
Sex,
Culture,
and
Rights:
A
Re/Conceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 607, 629 (1997) (noting that at the 1993 World Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna, women participants insisted that because the
“disempowerment of women is based on the public/private dichotomy,”
violence against women must be included on the agenda).
41
See Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing Declaration and
Platform for Action, ¶¶ 112-17 (Oct. 1995), available at http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/violence.htm.
42
In June 2000, the United Nations held a five-year implementation
review of the Fourth World Conference on women (Beijing Plus Five). For a
detailed summary, see International Policy UN Conferences: Fourth World
Conference on Women + 5, 2000, available at http://www.iwhc.org/
index.cfm. (stating that “feminist advocates and activists from more than
1,000 nongovernmental organizations met with government delegates from
148 countries to review progress made since the 1995 Fourth World
Conference on Women and to agree on further actions needed to accelerate
implementation of the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action”).
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not.” So, now we have polygamy as well. I heard another talk
about widowhood rituals as violence against women. This is
again a very large, growing, and hopefully not ultimately
incoherent category of behavior. The drawback of expanding the
definition of violence against women is potential incoherence.
I think the human rights framework offers another advantage
that Liz suggests, and that I would like to underscore. You can
think about problems as human rights violations that can then
become gendered. It is a way of expanding the definition of the
problem. She gives the example of Maquiladora export
processing zones in Mexico where there is a human rights
concern about excluding pregnant women from the workplace.43
This provides an opportunity to reexamine questions of equality
in workplaces and exclusionary legislation concerning pregnancy
elsewhere in the U.S. I have watched this in other human rights
debates where issues that are not always thought of in gender
terms become re-gendered. For example, there is a lot of talk
about effects of conflict on populations that become refugees in
armed conflict, and there is now an effort to look at the fact that
this is disproportionately affecting women and children.44 So you
can gender the effects of armed conflict. Refugees, women and
children are disproportionately victims.45 Women are subject to
violence in refugee camps; their partners have nothing to do; they
have no protection; they are living under plastic sheets. Thus,
they are in a sense more vulnerable to this problem.
43

SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 56 (using “the legal treatment of pregnant
workers in the maquiladora” as an example of a problem that exists in this
country as well but is not currently a focus of advocacy).
44
See, e.g., Amy Beth Abbott, Child Soldiers—The Use of Children As
Instruments of War, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 499, 504 (2000);
Judith Gardam, Women and the Law of Armed Conflict: Why the Silence?, 46
INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 55 (1997); Judith Gardam & Michelle Jarvis, Women
and Armed Conflict: The International Response to the Beijing Platform for
Action, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2000); Stuart Maslen, Relevance of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child to Children in Armed Conflict, 6
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 329 (1996).
45
See generally Gardam & Jarvis, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 11
(highlighting the impact of landmines in armed conflict and their effect on the
world’s refugee population, the majority of which are women and children).
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Globalization is increasing poverty in rural areas of the global
south, and it is often women and girls who fall disproportionately
into poverty.46
One of the recent interesting discussions is about the effect of
AIDS, looked at in a gendered way. The rate of increase of
AIDS among teenagers in southern Africa is five or six times as
high for girls as for boys.47 This is probably because girls marry
older, more sexually experienced men, and as wives, they cannot
really ask for safe sex.48 To look at the gender dimension of these
problems and to think about them globally as violence is quite
interesting. In discussions of racism, again it is women of color
who are more often victims. Trafficked women are often women
of color.49 Those who have difficulty with exclusion from work
46

See Press Kit, Fact Sheet No. 1: The Feminization of Poverty, Special
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Women 2000: Gender
Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century (June 2000),
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/followup/session/presskit/fs1.htm.
at
See also Zillah Eisenstein, Stop Stomping on the Rest of Us: Retrieving
Publicness from the Privatization of the Globe, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 59, 87 (1996).
47
The United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS found that there are
roughly 13.3 million women living in Sub-Saharan Africa with HIV/AIDS
compared to 10.9 million men. Moreover, around twelve to thirteen million
women become newly infected with HIV for every ten million men. Gender
and HIV, United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (Mar. 2001), available at
http://www.unaids.org/fact_sheets/files/GenderFS_en.doc. See also R.W.
Johnson, Analysis: Infant Rape Captures AIDS Crisis, United Press
International, Nov. 24, 2001 (stating that “statistics show that women catch
HIV far more easily than men and because men tend to be attracted to younger
women, the HIV rates among teenage girls are far higher than among boys,”
and asserting that this knowledge of young women in their early twenties
dying of AIDS has become quite common, making girls of younger and
younger ages vulnerable to men who believe that only sex with a virgin will
cleanse them of the spell of AIDS).
48
See WHO, Fact Sheet No. 242: Women and HIV/AIDS (2000), at
http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact242.html (reporting that African women are
expected to marry or have relations with older men). See also Tina Susman,
Staggering Numbers in Africa/Young Women Losing AIDS Battle, NEWSDAY,
July 13, 2000, at A38 (reporting that girls in male-dominated societies are
afraid to demand use of condoms).
49
See, e.g., Berta Esperanza Hernandez, Latinas, Culture & Human
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are not just people of color but often women of color.50 Again,
you can see what adding gender does to this issue. I think this is
a very productive way to think about a range of issues of violence
against women, which brings us back to the larger, more
structural kind of analysis where feminism began.
In a sense, this is the upbeat part of the book, this is the hope
for the future. I wish I could be quite as optimistic as this little
description of mine has just sounded, and as I think Liz wants to
be, but I find reasons for some pessimism, as I said earlier.
There is a lot at stake here; there is a lot of resistance globally to
undermining marriage structures.51 I see a strong tendency to
introduce the same kinds of individual rights-based approaches
that we have tried and found difficult and problematic in the
United States. Among others, there are efforts to establish
Rights: A Model for Making Change, Saving a Soul, 23 WOMEN’S RTS. L.
REP. 21, 24 (2001) (asserting that, along with dire social, political, civil and
cultural biases for mistreatment, race becomes a significant factor often
resulting in disparately high occurrences of trafficking amongst women of
color). See generally Anita Sinha, Domestic Violence and U.S. Asylum Law:
Eliminating the “Cultural Hook” for Claims Involving Gender Related
Prosecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562 (2001).
50
See generally Mary K. O’Melveny, Playing the Gender Card:
Affirmative Action and Working Women, 84 KY. L.J. 863, 891 (1995);
Deborah L. Rhode, Perspectives of Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV.
1163, 1173, 1179 (1988); Symposium, Civil Rights Legislation in the 1990s:
Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall, Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of
Race and Gender in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775, 779
(1991).
51
Global efforts by women activists in this area have led to international
conferences in Nairobi in 1985 and Beijing in 1995. In addition, activists’
efforts resulted in the appointment of a United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Violence. SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 53-54. However, there has been
widespread criticism of the lack of concrete results. Id. at 54. The United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence recently issued a report criticizing
foreign governments for a “lack of strategies of implementation on
commitments to eradicate violence” and their overwhelming failure to meet
international obligations to prevent, investigate, and prosecute domestic abuse.
Id. See also Gustavo Capdevila, Gov’t Indifferent to Domestic Violence, U.N.
Says, INTERPRESS SERV., Apr. 19, 1999; Hilary Charlesworth, The Mid-Life
Crisis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 781, 794 (1998).
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shelters, to have mandatory arrests, no-drop prosecution, and to
mount legal defenses for women who kill their batterers. I
recently found myself sitting in a room in Beijing talking to a
group of women who asked me, “How do I start a shelter?” On
the one hand, this is very important; on the other hand, we have
been through a lot of issues around what makes shelters work,
and it is going to be a complicated problem to make one work in
Beijing. I think this makes Schneider’s book important to the
global movement. It is valuable to show how these mechanisms
have and have not developed and functioned in the U.S. from the
perspective of a legal scholar and activist. This book is invaluable
for the global movement, and I think activists in different parts of
the world would benefit from it.
Christine Harrington
On that note of instability and hope and transition, we will
turn to Renée.
Renée Römkens
My existence is one of transition from the Netherlands to the
United States, going back and forth between the two countries. In
this context, with all its inherent disruptions, my comments
reflect this condition.
Let me first and foremost compliment Liz Schneider on her
book; it is unique and important in its presentation and analysis.
It is timely in the sense that it presents a thorough and
comprehensive history of the development of the many various
legal battles that have been fought in the American battered
women’s movement at a moment in history that feminist legal
politics in the domain of domestic violence seem to have entered
mainstream politics, certainly in the United States.52 The book
contains a wealth of information, and one of the many things I
really like about it is that it is written in a very accessible way.
When covering both developments in academic theoretical
52

SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 12-20, 42-45.
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debates and developments in legal practice and activism in the
U.S., it is a laudable accomplishment to present the material in
such a way that makes it accessible to a wide audience without
simplifying its complexity. In that respect, Liz Schneider’s work
in general, not only this book, provides important and valuable
resources to activists as well as scholars. I want to thank her for
that. I very much agree with Sally that this book deserves to be
read widely, both in the United States and internationally! It
provides important insights about the gains and the losses that
legal struggles inevitably imply.
As a feminist academic coming from the Netherlands, who
has worked as a researcher in the field of domestic violence for a
good part of the last twenty years, and now lives in the U.S., I
will comment on Schneider’s book from a Western European
perspective. What can we in a European context learn from
American feminist-inspired legal developments where the topic of
domestic violence has been subject to elaborate law-making as
well as policy development? What kind of inspiration does the
American experience offer, given that American feminist legal
developments take place in a different socio-legal context
compared to Western Europe? Is more legal regulation actually
an advantage? Besides my praise for Schneider’s book, which is
admittedly too brief, I will focus on the two issues from the book
that have inspired me to critical reflection.
The first point that is particularly appropriate to raise in a law
and society context concerns the relationship between social and
legal developments. What are the implications of the shift that the
concept of the battered woman seems to have made from a social
category in the early 1970s, launched by a social and political
feminist movement, to a legal category in the 1990s (particularly
in the U.S.) that has entered mainstream politics? This first point
touches upon Schneider’s discussion of the dialectical relationship
between law and its social and educational effects.53 The second
point is an issue that Schneider herself addresses throughout the
book, but especially toward the end: what are the limits and the
possibilities of the kind of political or social transformation that
53

Id. at 199-200.
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law can bring about? And, most importantly, what are the
dilemmas that feminist law reformers confront? In that respect,
my comments might overlap with some of Sally Merry’s
remarks. I will concentrate on what I consider to be the
unintended consequences of legal regulation.
My first point concerns what Schneider labels the dialectical
process of lawmaking. We are at the point in history when the
category of the battered woman seems to have shifted in a
political-strategic context from a primarily social to a
predominantly legal category. The battered woman is the subject
(and object) of increasing regulation that, in theory, is intended
to support and/or protect victims. This regulation often has law
as its basic vehicle, certainly in the U.S. What struck me
throughout the book is Schneider’s emphasis on the positive facts
of that shift. And she has valid reasons for so doing. The
problem of wife abuse in the U.S. has definitely shifted—no
matter how ambiguously—from a private problem to be dealt
with in shame, if not in silence, by the individuals concerned to a
social concern that receives public attention and is the subject of
various public interventions. There has been a development of
public concern and responsibility to intervene in which legal
change has acted as an important vehicle. In that respect the book
illuminates the dialectical relationship between the social and the
legal domain. At the same time, Schneider presents an impressive
collection of data that illustrates the underlying tension inherent
in this shift. Despite the fact that battering has moved into the
public domain and that the public discourse, as rhetoric and as
praxis, has expanded, particularly through the invocation of law,
the implementation of law to address domestic violence often
relegates it to the private sphere. The DeShaney case is a very
tragic example of this problem.54 In other words, the
implementation of legal regulation of wife battering turns out to
be very ambiguous and full of resistance against taking public

54

See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S.
189, 195-97 (1989) (ruling that the state lacks any affirmative obligation to
prevent domestic violence or to protect individuals against it if the source of
harm is private).
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responsibility. Schneider emphasizes that traditional notions of
privacy as justification for non-intervention sustain violence.55
But I think that the underlying public-private analysis
disadvantages battered women in more complex and paradoxical
ways than Schneider lays out in her book.
First, emphasizing the negative consequences of the ideology
of privacy, i.e. as justifying non-intervention and leaving victims
of battering without de facto and de jure protection, has
paradoxically also led to a social and legal climate in the U.S.
where legally-based criminal justice interventions in the private
domain are currently advocated as necessary and legitimate, even
against the wishes of the victim. The most obvious example is the
institutionalization of mandatory arrest laws or no-drop policies.
Mandatory arrest is critiqued as too blunt an instrument to
demonstrate the state’s commitment to take responsibility for
responding to wife abuse and too problematic an intervention into
private life, disproportionately affecting women of color.56
55

SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 15-20, 88-94, 97.
A number of commentators have noted the problems inherent in
mandatory arrest laws. See, e.g., Donna Coker, Shifting the Power for
Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1042-49 (2000) (noting inappropriate arrests and
prosecution of battered women under mandatory arrest laws, poor women’s
exposure to state control when jurisdictions require police to report each
domestic violence call as suspected child abuse, and mandatory arrest policies
creating backlash against low-income women); Linda Mills, Killing Her Softly:
Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV.
550, 555, 565 (1999) (arguing that the very state interventions designed to
help battered women often replicate the emotional abuse of the battering
relationship, and that studies on mandatory arrests have shown that the
frequency of repeat violence against battered women increased when those
arrested were unemployed, African-American, or high school dropouts);
Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence
Cases, UMKC L. REV. 33, 71-78 (2000) (noting the various criticisms of
mandatory arrests as paternalistic, disempowering, and likely to increase
violence for women who are African-American or whose abusers are
unemployed); Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting Batterers? Analysis and
Policy Implications of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 929, 930-31 (1994) (noting that the issue of mandatory arrest cannot
be seen in isolation and is impacted by prosecutorial decision-making and
56
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Nevertheless, these critiques are considered of secondary
importance, and they have not changed the increasing
implementation nationwide of these policies.57 Advocates argue
that it is the responsibility of the state to unequivocally and firmly
sanction and punish criminal, violent behavior in the family.58
The argument that the offender’s arrest and prosecution might
entail an intervention in the victim’s private life that she did not
intend or want is considered to be understandable at best, but
irrelevant in the process of legal implementation. This is a direct
consequence of the shift of wife abuse from the private to the
public domain and illustrates how the underlying binary of the
public and the private is upheld and has, in the implementation of
its consequences, been simply turned into its opposite. In other
words, the complexity and nuance in analysis, in which wife
abuse is perceived as a public and private problem
simultaneously, with all the complexities and ambiguities that that
brings for both victims and lawmakers, has hardly been
follow-through subsequent to arrest).
57
See Somini Sengupta, Domestic Violence Law Set for Renewal, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2001, available at http://college3.nytimes.com/guests/
articles/2001/06/11/851359.xml (“Over the last decade . . . most states have
instituted mandatory-arrest laws, according to the National Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, an umbrella group of advocates.”). See also ROBERT L.
SNOW, FAMILY ABUSE: TOUGH SOLUTIONS TO STOP THE VIOLENCE, 260-61
(Plenum Trade ed., Plenum Publ’g Corp. 1997).
58
Some advocates argue that domestic violence is a public crime and
therefore the state has a responsibility to “intervene aggressively” in order to
“communicate[] and follow[] through on the message that the state will not
tolerate violence of any sort.” Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated
Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1849, 1865 (1996). Some further argue that the state condones and promotes
violence when it refuses to intervene. Id. See also Matthew Litsky, Explaining
the Legal System’s Inadequate Response to the Abuse of Women: A Lack of
Coordination, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 149 (1990) (arguing for state
intervention through the coordination of the legislature, police, prosecutors,
and judiciary); Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System’s Response to a
Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L.
REV. 267 (1985) (contending that “[f]ull-scale, vigorous legal response to
battering remains the exception and not the rule” and recommending stronger
intervention by police, prosecutors, and judiciary).
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acknowledged. The problem with mandatory interventions in
wife battering is that political recognition of this as a public
problem risks eclipsing the private interests that women, as
agents, maintain. As a response to the claim that wife battering is
a social problem that requires the state to take public
responsibility, the baby is sometimes thrown out with the bath
water. The fact that law, notably criminal law, has been used as a
major vehicle to materialize this public responsibility, only
exacerbates this dynamic. Law, as the motor of regulation based
on general rules and principles that operate within an either/or
paradigm, is by definition not well suited to address the messy
complexities of public violence in the private home.59
Secondly, this shift to defining the battered woman as a
public identity—in the United States as a legal identity60—
deserves to be analyzed in an American socio-legal context.
Maybe we are facing a typical American development given
America’s “love affair with law,” a phenomenon that is quite
striking from a Western European perspective and not as
prominently developed in Western Europe.61 Battering has
entered the public domain in the U.S. through a rights regime. In
Europe—not only in the Netherlands, but also in the U.K., where
there is even more of a rights regime than in the Netherlands,
Germany, France, or other European countries—we see a
different approach than that used in the United States. Without
wanting to sound too optimistic, in Western European countries
there is more of a balance between the legal and the social
category and the social policy strategies that the battered

59

See also Renée Römkens, Protecting Prosecution, CRIME &
DELINQUENCY (forthcoming 2002).
60
See supra note 11 (regarding the United States battered women’s
movement); infra note 64 (regarding the Violence Against Women Act of
1994).
61
See, e.g., Susan L. Miller & Rosemary Barberet, A Cross-Cultural
Comparison of Social Reform: The Growing Pains of the Battered Women’s
Movements in Washington, D.C. and Madrid, Spain, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY
923 (1994) (concluding that criminal justice respondents in the United States
advocated arrests in conjunction with social services, while in Spain, these
respondents were more reluctant to endorse criminal sanctions).
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women’s movements have pursued in trying to devise supportive
policies, such as obtaining funding for shelters and hot lines.62 In
Western Europe the issue of battering has been a much more
effective domain of socio-political struggle than in the U.S. It is
an important point to bear in mind that when reflecting on the
relevance of American feminist legal achievements in an
international context. These achievements need to be socially and
culturally contextualized. We have to assess critically how
successful the political strategy has been to focus on legalizing
the identity of the battered woman as a vehicle to gain, among
other things, political and community support, public attention,
and state intervention.
That brings me to the second and more general point: what
are the limits and the possibilities of law? In her book, Schneider
focuses on the possibilities of law. Obviously, law is an
important and sometimes necessary instrument in the sense that it
can facilitate the translation of a social problem into a subject of
public concern and even public responsibility that provides
citizens with an entitlement to public care, concern, protection or
support. Schneider’s book stimulates us to think about what we
need and want from law from a feminist social justice
perspective. In addition to important issues that Schneider raises,
we need a better understanding of the structural limitations that
are inherent in law. Law is inevitably an instrument of
governance, a powerful instrument in the hands of legislators,
administrators, governments and their representatives, deployed
in order to regulate society and its citizens. What is particularly

62

The European Union has established three priorities in combating
violence: the enactment of legislation; the enforcement of that legislation; and
the modification of societal attitudes and stereotypes. See EU Reaffirms
Commitment to Punishing Violence Against Women, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS
SERV., Mar. 7, 2002. The European Union has enacted Daphne, an action
program that does not focus predominantly on criminal legal projects, unlike
most VAWA grants in the United States. The E.U. program, Daphne, funds
forty-seven projects aimed at “combating violence against women and
children.” See Press Release, Commission of the European Communities, The
European Commission Supports Fight Against Violence to Women and
Children (Dec. 20, 2000).

SCHNEIDERMACRO 7-11FINALWINTRO.DOC

344

7/24/02 1:18 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

telling is that the legalizing tendency discussed before is so
profoundly dominated by criminal law. Is the feminist social
movement to be remembered for its influence on criminal law, as
Sanford Kadish recently indicated?63 The question then becomes,
if this is a victory, might it resemble a Pyrrhic victory, one that
implies substantial damage? The overinvestment in criminal legal
interventions within the Violence Against Women Act
(“VAWA”) and the grants that flow from VAWA—millions of
dollars going to support pilot projects and fund research into
criminal justice interventions, notably mandatory arrest, and lack
of support to the civil rights remedy—is more than just an
unfortunate side effect.64 A criminal rights regime is by definition
focused on control and punishment. It might reflect a tendency
that represents the increasingly punitive attitude toward social ills
and problems that is prominent in the United States.65 Domestic

63

In his recent essay on changes in the past fifty years in criminal law,
Sanford Kadish views the influence of feminism on criminal law as a “social
development to be remembered.” Sanford Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal
Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 981 (1999). He points in
particular to changes in rape law and in the law of self-defense. Id. at 975-79.
64
Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”), Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title
IV, 108 Stat. 1941 (codified as amended in various sections of 42 U.S.C.).
VAWA, passed as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, is a comprehensive effort to address the problem of violence
against women through a variety of mechanisms, including increased funding
for women’s shelters, a national domestic abuse hotline, rape education and
prevention programs, and training for federal and state judges. SCHNEIDER,
supra note 1, at 188-98. It provided for reform of remedies available to
battered immigrant women, development of an innovative civil rights remedy,
and a host of other provisions including criminal enforcement of interstate
orders of protection. VAWA’s civil rights remedy created a federal civil rights
cause of action so that all women who had been physically abused because of
their gender could sue their attackers in federal court. It permitted
compensatory and punitive damages as well as equitable relief. This provision,
however, was held unconstitutional under United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 627 (2000) (concluding that Congress lacked constitutional authority
under the Commerce Clause to enact VAWA since gender-motivated crimes
were not considered economic activity). For a more thorough discussion of
Morrison, see infra note 84.
65
See GARLAND, supra note 32, at 52-60 (discussing a reversion to a
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violence is more the subject of post-hoc, mostly criminal legal
interventions and control of perpetrators than of prevention or
support of victims.66
We need to be aware of the limits of law, as well as of its
contradictory effects, when it comes to bringing about social
transformation, or bringing about social justice, in this case for
battered women. Schneider’s work points out consistently that
law, most notably criminal law, is not an easy tool with which to
work. Its accessibility is limited, and, as Sally Merry mentioned
already, lawyering in this domain is problematic. The legal
process itself brings about many subversions of the original
intentions of the law. From that perspective the term “feminist
lawmaking,” although relevant on a descriptive level, sounds
somewhat optimistic. The law in this domain does not just
provide rights as trumps to be cashed in while struggling against
violence against women and for social justice. Rights are equally,
if not more, instruments to control, to monitor, and to subject the
rights bearers to a regime that constitutes legal identities that do
not necessarily serve the interests of the rights bearers who are
initially looking for support. In this domain there are many
compelling examples of how laws subvert their intended support.
The “battered woman’s syndrome,”67 for example, is a very
clear example, as are mandatory arrest laws. The term “feminist
lawmaking” as the project that motivates this book pictures
leading developments in this field as a politically emancipatory
more punitive criminal justice system).
66
Domestic violence is another example of a social problem that has
become subjugated through criminalization in the current “culture of control”
as analyzed by David Garland. See GARLAND, supra note 32. For a critical
analysis of the rights regime in the field of domestic violence, see Renée
Römkens, Law As a Trojan Horse: Unintended Consequences of Rights-Based
Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 265
(2001). See also Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in
Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 80205 (2001) (arguing that the litmus test for measuring effective laws or policies
for battered women should be whether legal or social service interventions
enhance women’s access to material resources).
67
See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing “battered
woman syndrome”).
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project. In doing so, it pictures the law from a slightly modernist
perspective as a mechanism that brings about progress. Laws in
the domain of battering certainly bring a civilizing message that it
is morally wrong and illegal. Of course, I agree with the
message. But using the law as an instrument to bring that
message across means the invocation of an instrument that
demands a considerable price. In that respect, the book appears
to reflect an optimism about what law can accomplish. This same
optimism that I read in it, seductive as it is, has inspired me to
reflect on the limitations of law and how this might be related to
politics of rights.68 From an international perspective it is
important to learn lessons from these achievements in addition to
the counterproductive effect of feminist legal struggles in the
United States and elsewhere. This book documents a crucial part
of that history and inspires us to engage in global dialogues!
Christine Harrington
I have a question, Renée. When you stated that from the
European perspective the relationship between social categories
and legal categories is more balanced in contrast to the American
viewpoint, I wondered whether politics regarding services have
experiences similar to or different from changes in the United
States. For example, has there been a professionalization of antidomestic violence services? Liz commented that one objective
she had in writing the book was to reconnect gender to
violence.69 This is also part of her argument on refueling social
movements and the challenges faced as a result of
professionalization. Would you comment on the professionalization of services from a European view? I tend to think that in
the U.S. legalization is often confused with and coupled with
professionalization.

68

For a more elaborate discussion of the flipside of the politics of rights
for battered women, see Römkens, supra note 66.
69
See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 232 (arguing for the need to link
violence to gender inequality).
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Betsy Stanko
If you do not mind, Chris, as an audience member I would
like to respond to your question. One of the observations I have
made after living in London for the last twenty years (after
previously living in the U.S.) is about the differences between a
U.S. and European perspective on the use of law in domestic
violence situations. I have asked myself about the impact of the
decline of the welfare state in the U.S. on the emergence of law
as the primary remedy to many harms. In the U.K., for example,
we still have a welfare state. The government not only believes in
the public sector but also has a real desire to respond to the needs
of people.70 Much of the activist feminist politics in and around
the violence against women movement in the U.K. expects to
engage the entire public sector, not only the arm of the law.71
Campaigns to involve the public sector in responses to domestic
violence include a second layer of government, such as the local
authority or the local health authority, in the provision of help
and assistance.72
70

The British government established a Social Exclusion Unit in Downing
Street to create cross-departmental, integrated solutions to the problems of
those who fall through the welfare net. The unit has established eighteen
policy action teams to address the problems, including homelessness, poor
education, crime, inner city regeneration, and drug addiction. See Social
Security: Government Policy, UK: MEDIUM-TERM POLITICAL OUTLOOK, Jan.
30, 2002.
71
In the U.K. methods to cope with domestic violence engage the entire
public sector. Several examples include public awareness campaigns about
sexual and physical violence against women, training programs for public
services providers, and distribution of leaflets and good practice guidelines
instructing women and service providers on handling domestic violence. See
Betsy Stanko, A Profile of Violence Against Women, Criminal Justice
Conference-Violence Against Women (Nov. 24-25, 1999), available at
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/domesticviolence/stanko.htm. Such public efforts
have not infringed on law enforcement reform. Id.; see also infra note 72 on
the high degree of police involvement in Britain’s domestic violence
movement. Improving law enforcement’s understanding of domestic violence
issues remains a critical objective for feminist politics in the U.K. See
generally infra note 72.
72
Great Britain’s approach to domestic violence also utilizes a high
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I find myself appalled by the lack of social safety net in the
United States. In European life, the law and the police are only
one part of a solution to domestic violence. In the U.K. we
cannot even mandate arrest in domestic violence situations. But
under European rights legislation, we can begin to reconceptualize the need—indeed the duty—to protect people from
harm.73 I now hear police officers saying we have to do
something more in domestic violence situations because we have
a duty to protect. It is a new discourse. This is one hook that the
police in particular are using to make the health service devise
plans to protect people from domestic violence. So the police, as
one agent of law, are challenging others in the public sector to
take notice of domestic violence. This makes a huge difference in
degree of involvement by the centralized government through its criminal
justice system. See Rebecca Morley & Audrey Mullender, Police Research
Group, Preventing Domestic Violence to Women, in CRIME PREVENTION UNIT
SERIES: PAPER NO. 48, at 36 (Gloria Laycock ed., 1994). The hallmark 1990
Home Office Circular recommending police forces to develop strategies to
take positive, pro-arrest action against assailants of domestic violence victims
resulted in the proliferation of domestic violence units (“DVUs”);
furthermore, the police were the first statutory agencies created to achieve
accountability to the community with respect to domestic violence. See id. at
16-17. In addition, police policies are encouraged to maintain a pro-charge
attitude when prosecuting domestic violence offenders, although these policies
may not be entirely effective. Carolyn Hoyle & Andrew Sanders, Police
Response to Domestic Violence, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL. 14 (2000) (writing that
pro-arrest and pro-charge policies do not necessarily achieve results preferred
by victims themselves of cessation of violence). Community support through
refuges, support groups, and crisis services has also been emphasized. See
Morley & Mullender, supra at 30-34. Government policies continue to
emphasize close relationships between crime-fighters and social welfare
agencies, as well as police involvement. Jalna Hanmer & Sue Griffiths,
Reducing Domestic Violence . . . What Works? Policing Domestic Violence,
CRIME REDUCTION RESEARCH SERIES (Jan. 2000), at http://www.
homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/poldv.pdf.
73
See generally Subrata Paul, Combating Domestic Violence Through
Positive International Action in the International Community and in the United
Kingdom, India, and Africa, 7 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 227 (1999);
Susan Smolens, Violence Against Women: Consciousness and Law in Four
Central European Emerging Democracies—Poland, Hungrary, Slovakia, and
the Czech Republic, 15 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L. F. 1 (2001).
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finding additional space from law as a solution to domestic
violence.
Marianne Wesson
There are so many wonderful things about this book I could
spend my whole few minutes just talking about the things I
admire. But I do not want to do that, in part because I have said
many of those things in print,74 and in part because I would like
to engage with you today on two particular issues: the question of
privacy and the point both Liz and Renée have made about
Americans seeming to think of legal solutions and legal remedies
first before we consider other solutions to social problems. To
take the second point first, I think you are quite right in this
book, Liz, about the primacy Americans have placed on legal
rather than other solutions, and I have wondered why that is so.
The suggestion—a very useful observation—has been made that it
has something to do with the sort of social safety net that exists in
other countries but is increasingly dwindling in the United States.
I have been thinking about this because we have been traveling
around a little bit in Eastern Europe before landing here in
Budapest. Everywhere we have been, we have seen castles. We
visited several and were shown, among other things, treasure
troves of ancestral monarchies. I kept thinking, why is it I have
gone for years without seeing a castle (at least since my kid got
too old to go to Disneyland), and now that I am in Europe, I
spend every other day in one? We do not have such a tradition in
the U.S. We have never had a king; we do not have much of a
shared history.
The United States is an enormous country; it is increasingly
diverse; it is very violent. Many people who live in it consider
they do not share a great deal with all of their fellow
countrymen. The one thing that we do share, on the whole, is a
commitment to what we rather grandly call the Rule of Law. It is
not always such a grand thing, and it is not always benign.
Nevertheless, I think that is why we think of the law first, Renée,
74

Wesson, supra note 1, at 23.
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because we do not have anything else to appeal as a source of our
commonality or our national identity. We have this phrase—it is
a sexist phrase, but it is still useful—“We are a nation of laws,
not men.”75 The phrase implies that leaders and dynasties—we
undeniably still have those—will come and go, but the one thing
that will remain at bedrock is the rule of law. Of course, we still
struggle over its meaning. But I believe that is the reason we
think of the law so constantly and insistently, in a way a
European finds, no doubt, peculiar.
I want to say that one of the things I admire so much about
Liz’s book is her optimism. I know it is hard to share it all the
time. But I like reading something that reflects that “glass-is-halffull” attitude, especially after being at this conference. I have
been at quite a few panels, which I felt were all good, some
brilliant; however, it occurred to me that the official attitude of
this conference is pessimism. There might be a generic title
applicable to every panel that would be something like “an
exquisitely nuanced and profoundly insightful discussion of a
confessedly insoluble problem.” They mostly conclude, “Huh,
nothing can be done.” Or perhaps the more optimistic panels
conclude, “There is a great deal of work that remains to be
done.”
It is refreshing to encounter a divergence. I rarely encounter a
piece of writing that makes me feel like I want to go do this
work. Yes, of course there is a great deal of work remaining, and
Liz’s book serves as a useful inventory of what it might be. But it
is not said in a passive voice. It is said this way: “Look, let us
roll up our sleeves. There is a lot that remains to be done.” So I
like the way reading this book renewed in me the spirit of
commitment to the solution of this problem, even though the path
to a solution is not always clear.
I can only talk about this problem from my own position as
an American, a lawyer, and a former prosecutor. I tend to think

75

John Adams, Thoughts on Government, Jan. 1776, available at
http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/ja2/writings/tog.html (“[N]o good government
[exists] but what is republican . . . [and] the very definition of a republic is ‘an
empire of laws, and not of men.’”).

SCHNEIDERMACRO 7-11FINALWINTRO.DOC

7/24/02 1:18 PM

BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING

351

of those immediately as the aspects of my own identity that I can
mobilize in thinking about solving this problem, although those
are not the only helpful identities.
Now let me turn to the question of privacy and privatization.
Catharine MacKinnon once said—I think she was quoting
someone else—“Privacy is an injury got up as a gift.”76 She was
talking about the interest of women, of course. I have thought
about that phrase often. Usually, when people talk about privacy
they are talking about the gift—something desired, something
sought after. Do not get me wrong. I like my privacy as much as
the next person. I have never understood why for a few years
teenagers wanted to be Madonna, the woman who never has any
privacy. Even when she goes to the dentist, there is someone
there with a camera to record it. That just never appealed to me
at all. But I do think that the regime of privacy and the increasing
privatization of things once regarded as matters in the public
sphere carries with it many dangers for the vulnerable, and
especially for women.
I have heard a lot about privatization in attending various
panels at this conference. For example, speaking globally—and I
can only speak in a very general way because I do not have a lot
of expertise here—I have heard a lot of talk about growing
national deference to private economic arrangements. There is an
entire regime of international agreements that seek to
institutionalize and make permanent this deference by
governments to private economic arrangements,77 a kind of
privatization of the international economy coupled with measures
designed to discourage regulation that might make it less of a
brutal capitalistic enterprise. Whether that is good or bad, I do
not think anyone can deny that that we are seeing a trend. It is in
76

CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 10 (Harv. Univ. Press 1987).
77
See generally Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil
Society, 6 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 405, 431 (1997) (explaining that
treaties are interpreted as self-executing when private economic or commercial
interests are protected); Neil Munro, Cybercrime Treaty on Trial, NAT’L J.,
Mar. 10, 2001 (discussing an anti-crime treaty being drafted in Europe and
how privacy advocates feel this may undermine economic growth).
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part the product of a kind of utilitarian argument that seems to be
at its maximum influence these days, the proposition that
government is less efficient than private institutions at the
promotion of certain kinds of social goods.
At this conference I have also heard about the proliferation of
a regime of private decision-making, frequently by arbitration. In
the United States, for example, if you sign a contract for the
purchase of goods, it is very likely that, if there is any kind of
formality at all to the agreement, you sign away your right to
bring litigation against the manufacturer or seller of those
goods.78 You are required, if there is a dispute, to submit to
arbitration.79 And the agreement might even provide that the
seller of the goods will designate the arbitrator. As a result, you
as the consumer give away your right to a public remedy in favor
of an agreement (which is extorted from you because it is the
only way you can buy the camera or whatever it is you want).
The purchasing public has no other choice but to submit to the
privatization of dispute resolution.
Privatization arrangements also prevail in many sorts of
employment agreements.80 We have seen in the United States

78

See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987) (stating that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, establishes a
federal policy favoring arbitration and requires courts to rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate).
79
See, e.g., Taubman v. Prospect Drilling & Sawing, Inc., 469 N.W.2d
335 (Minn. App. 1991) (discussing how the Minnesota Sales Representative
Act, Minnesota’s version of the Uniform Securities Act, requires disputes to
be submitted to arbitration); Helena Chemical Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486,
492 (Tex. 2001) (discussing the requirement to submit to arbitration in the
context of sales of goods). See also Richard A. Bales, A New Direction for
American Labor Law, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1863, 1912 (1994) (surveying
Supreme Court cases demonstrating judicial receptiveness to arbitration clause
enforcement in commercial sales contracts and judicial interpretation of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1-14).
80
See, e.g., John-Paul Motley, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in
Employment Contracts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 687, 688 (1998) (stating that
employment lawyers began encouraging employers to insert binding
arbitration clauses into all employment contracts and other agreements). See
generally Cole v. Burns Int’l Secretary Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
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Supreme Court within the last couple of years an endorsement of
the legality and propriety of these kinds of arrangements, in
which people sign away their right to seek a public remedy in
favor of a privatized remedy.81 Our president has initiated a
discussion about the desirability of privatizing much or all of our
Social Security system,82 which is the system of old age pensions
for people in the United States. It has always been organized as a
public agency, administered by public servants who were
answerable, as governmental agencies are, but powerful interests
promote to substitute this public system for a private one by
making security in one’s old age an individual matter of
accumulating money, investing it, and then moving one’s
investment around in an entrepreneurial manner. So I see a lot of
evidence that this trend toward privatization is continuing and
accelerating, and I wonder what that means for the movement for
the protection of battered and vulnerable women and children.
One of the things that Liz talks about in her book is the
Violence Against Women Act of 1994.83 But as Renée mentions,
in a development that came after the book was published, the

(discussing the Federal Arbitration Act in relation to employment contracts).
81
See E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 754, 762 (2002)
(stating that the language of the Federal Arbitration Act manifests a policy
favoring arbitration agreements); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105
(2001) (ruling that employer’s action to compel employee into arbitration was
proper and not exempt from the Federal Aviation Act); Green Tree Financial
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (affirming the district
court’s compelled arbitration); Cortez Byrd Chips v. Bill Harbert Construction
Co., 529 U.S. 193 (2000) (ruling that the Federal Arbitration Act’s venue
provisions are permissive and allow a motion to confirm, vacate, or modify an
arbitration award).
82
See David W. Chen, The Social Security Debate Plays San Diego,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at A12. In May 2001, President George W. Bush
created the commission to develop proposals to overhaul the social security
program including private investment accounts. See President’s Commission to
Strengthen Social Security, at http://www.csss.gov (last visited Apr. 21,
2002).
83
The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title
IV, 108 Stat. 1941 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
See supra note 64.
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United States Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison
declared unconstitutional the civil rights remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act, the portions that would have given women
who were victims of gender-motivated violence a right to seek a
private remedy in the federal courts of the United States.84 One
can put forth various explanations of this decision, but to me it
represents a rather subtle statement of the old premise that this
kind of violence really is a private matter. It is not important
enough, and it does not have significant enough nation-wide
effects for the federal courts to have any jurisdiction to consider
it. It has to be considered (if at all) by local courts, by local
authorities. State courts are all right for those cases, but the
federal courts—the big courts, the important courts, the courts
that deal with momentous matters significant to the nation and the
nation’s health—really do not have any jurisdiction over this
rather small private matter. I am being perhaps a bit sarcastic,

84

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The plaintiff in
Morrison, Christy Brzonkala, a freshman at Virginia Polytechnic Institute,
alleged rape by two defendant varsity football players. After the university
judicial committee failed to find sufficient evidence to punish them, the
plaintiff brought civil suits against the university under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§
1681-88, for the handling of her complaint and against both varsity football
players under 42 U.S.C. § 13981, codifying § 40302 of the Violence Against
Women Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1941-42, which provides that persons may
receive compensatory, punitive, declarative, or injunctive relief from those
who have deprived them of their right to be free from gender-motivated
violence. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604. The district court dismissed the
plaintiff’s case against the university for failure to state a claim, concluding
that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 604-05. In Morrison, the case against the
football players, the Supreme Court held that Congress lacked constitutional
power under the Commerce Clause even to provide a civil remedy for gendermotivated violence, which the Court said constituted intrastate non-economic
activity not substantially related to interstate commerce. Id. at 613-18, relying
on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court explicitly left
open the possibility of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers to regulate noneconomic activities affecting interstate commerce, but declined to place
gender-motivated violence within Congress’ power to regulate, fearing that
permitting federal regulation of such an attenuated relationship to interstate
commerce would over-broaden Congress’ regulatory powers. Id. at 614-16.
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but I think that is a defensible reading of what the court was
saying in Morrison.85 And if I am right in my reading of this case
together with other developments in United States constitutional
law, I see a gradual but relentless enlargement of this sphere of
privacy, inside of which the government may not or will not be
inclined to look. I do not think that is a good thing for vulnerable
people or for battered women.
You may know that the President of the United States,
George W. Bush, when asked whom he would appoint to
vacancies on the United States Supreme Court, if any should
arise (as it is very likely that they will during his term), said he
would like to appoint more justices like two of the present
members of the court—Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia.86 So I
am always interested in what these two jurists are saying and
doing because it seems likely that they may be replicated before
long. When I look at their decisions across a broad range of
subject matters, I find that this concern with privacy, the
protection of someone’s right to keep certain matters private and
away from the gaze of the government, is a pervading theme,
even when the question is one on which a person George W.
Bush admires would take a different view. For example, Justices
Scalia and Thomas are quite willing to vote against the
government in matters involving criminal prosecution and in
85

Id. For further discussion of Morrison, see Julie Goldscheid, United
States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against
Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 109 (2000); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male
Sovereignty: On United States V. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135 (2000);
Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe,
111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001); Judith Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary:
Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against Women Act, 74 S.
CAL. L. REV. 269 (2000).
86
Laurie Kellman, Bush, Gore Touted Different Justices, A.P. ONLINE,
Dec. 11, 2000 (“Throughout the year, Bush tried to frame the issue in terms
of philosophy, saying his ideal nominees would base their judgments strictly
on the words of the Constitution. Pressed to name a justice who fits that mold,
Bush pointed to Scalia and Thomas.”); Stephen B. Presser, How Bush Would
Fix the Supremes, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2000 (“Bush said he wants more
justices like them [Scalia and Thomas].”).
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favor of the defendant when they feel that the right to privacy is
implicated.87 I am thinking especially of a recent decision
addressing whether the police could use what is called a thermal
imaging device to look—not look, literally, but to sense what was
going on—inside the walls of a house.88 Thermal imaging devices
are law enforcement tools used to detect activities like the
cultivation of marijuana, which uses growing lamps that generate
a certain amount of heat. Prior to this decision, the Court had
found that, in some remarkably similar situations, there was no
violation of our Constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.89 In this matter, however, the Court found
differently, and Justices Scalia and Thomas were careful to state
their view that—they did not quite put it this way, but they might
as well have—a man’s house is his castle. And inside one’s

87

See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S 91 (1990) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
joining majority) (holding that overnight guest who stays in another’s house
with the owner’s permission legitimately shares the owner’s expectation of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment). But see Indianapolis v. Edmond, 121
S. Ct. 447, 458, 460-62 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ.
dissenting) (joining Chief Justice Rehnquist in rejecting the majority’s finding
that City of Indianapolis’ use of drug-sniffing dogs at traffic checkpoints
violated the Fourth Amendment; finding, instead, a lowered level of Fourth
Amendment protection in a car, as opposed to a private residence); Minnesota
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91-99 (1998) (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., concurring)
(concurring with majority’s reasoning in denying Fourth Amendment
protection from discovery of illegal activities by police officer who looked
through window of the house where defendants were bagging cocaine).
88
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (finding warrantless
thermal imaging searches in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment when
used to detect emanations from the home).
89
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (holding that defendant had no
reasonable expectation that his curtilage was protected from naked eye
observation from a helicopter four-hundred feet above); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding no Fourth Amendment violation when police
officers trained in marijuana identification took aerial photographs of
defendant’s property from a private plane prior to securing warrant); Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (holding that the EPA’s
surveillance of defendant’s premises from a plane using an aerial mapping
camera to enhance human vision did not constitute a Fourth Amendment
violation).
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house, one is entitled to keep what is happening away from the
view of the authorities.90
There was another very overlooked decision about a year
ago, a case called United States v. Hubbell,91 which involved a
rather technical question. But in their concurring opinion in that
case, Justices Thomas and Scalia declared a remarkably broad
view of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures, suggesting that a person has a right to refuse, for
example, the drawing of blood or the taking of fingerprints, or
speaking for voice print analysis, very standard techniques of law
enforcement.92 This is a position that the Court has not taken or
even considered seriously in about forty years.93 So I see all of
these decisions as presaging a trend in our Supreme Court toward
greater protection of the right of privacy, at least in one’s home
and one’s person.
Now this leads me to another point. Privacy is not a good that
is lying around on the ground waiting for all of us to pick it up if
we only are attracted to it. Privacy must be purchased like
anything else. If you are not convinced, just try traveling around
Europe for a while and staying some nights in lodgings that cost
$25 a night and other nights in lodgings that cost $250 a night,
and compare the amount of privacy you enjoy in those two kinds
of lodgings. They are not the same because privacy is expensive.
Privacy is far more available to those who have money to buy it
than those who do not. The trend toward the enlargement of the
sphere of privacy couples with my view that privacy is a good

90

Kyllo, 525 U.S. at 28, 34.
530 U.S. 27 (2000).
92
Id. at 49-56 (arguing the term, “witness,” has a broader meaning than
that given by the majority, such that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination would protect against the compelled production of not only
incriminating testimony but also any other incriminating evidence, thus
interpreting protection against searches and seizures to include a person’s
refusal to comply with certain standard techniques of law enforcement).
93
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (permitting the
prosecution to compel production of self-incriminating evidence that lacked
testimonial character). Cf. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 56 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ.
concurring).
91
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that can be purchased by the well-off, but is unaffordable to the
poor, which deepens my concern about these developments.
In conclusion, there are various developments in American
constitutional law that point toward an increasing emphasis on the
preservation of a private sphere behind an impenetrable veil. The
analysis Liz provides in her book of the role that privacy has
played in denying protection to battered women makes these
developments especially troubling to me. At one point Liz
recounts going to a demonstration, I think it was in Washington,
D.C., and seeing a young woman holding a sign that said, “The
power to stop violence against women begins with me.”94 Liz
points out that this is in one way an inspiring message, because it
is empowering; it suggests that each of us has the opportunity as
individuals to do things to better our lives and protect ourselves.95
It is also to some extent a discouraging message because it
suggests that it is purely the responsibility of each woman to
protect herself, and that public agencies and public officials have
no obligations in that regard. Suppose that sign had said
something just a little bit different. Suppose it had said, “The
responsibility to stop violence against women belongs to you.”
Or suppose it said, “The responsibility to stop violence against a
woman belongs to that woman.” Now imagine that sign being
held up not by a young girl but by the justices of the United
States Supreme Court. I am afraid we are going in that direction.
As Liz points out, we have been there, and we do not want to go
back.
Christine Harrington
Liz, would you like to make a few comments, and then we
will open the discussion?
Liz Schneider
Yes. Thanks to all of you for really full, rich readings of the
94
95

SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 231.
Id.
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book. I really appreciate the closeness of your analysis, and I am
really interested in your reactions. It is always this amazing
feeling when you write something. You have your own sense
about what it is that you have sent out into the world. There then
are all these different reactions to it and readings of it. People
bring their own perspectives to it. Many of you saw the film
yesterday, “Live Nude Girls Unite.”96 People watched this
ninety-minute film, and everybody brought something different to
the discussion afterwards. Some people brought labor history,
and some people brought issues of motherhood, and some people
brought questions of sexuality. It is always so interesting to hear
people’s responses to what one has put “out there.”
A lot of the issues that each of the readers have raised are
issues about which I am continuing to think. Let me just try to
highlight some of those issues. First, the point that both Sally and
Renée made about criminalization is a question that I try to
address in the book.97 I definitely see criminalization as a serious,
serious issue, and the move to criminalize domestic violence in
this country is very troubling. Indeed, the thesis of the book is
that without a broader comprehension of a social welfare
framework for understanding the interrelationship between
violence and welfare, and women’s economic situation, and
socialization, and sexual harassment, and all those things, we
cannot really address the violence.98 Criminalization as a solution
in itself is a big problem, and I discuss this problem in the book.
Sally’s point about the convergence of issues that are coming
together around criminalization is very valuable, and I agree with
it. It is a very problematic move. It is a move that manifests the
problem that I try to address in the book, that domestic violence
is viewed as a problem in and of itself and not linked to the
larger issues of women’s economic situation, gender
socialization, sex segregation, reproduction, and women’s
subjugation within the family. But I also think understanding the
other forces that both Sally and Mimi are highlighting, which
96
97
98

LIVE NUDE GIRLS UNITE! (Julia Query & Vicky Funari, 2000).
SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 6, 181-98.
Id. at 6-8.
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converge in that move towards criminalization, is very valuable.
The international human rights piece that Sally brings up here
is really fascinating. It is particularly wonderful, Sally, because
this is something that I am working on in a new paper.99 In the
book, I leave open the way in which these issues are reframed in
the international human rights context. By coincidence, I have
also been in China since I wrote the book and also experienced
some of the inappropriateness of the American context. But there
are ways in which the human rights frame (although there is
resistance to CEDAW100 and the human rights framework) can
move beyond an individual psychological criminalizing
perspective. That was a particularly important aspect of your
comments, Sally. As you were speaking, I felt like we were
reading each other’s minds.
To address Sally and Renée’s comments about the cultural
context, I have a colleague, Judi Greenberg, who teaches at New
England School of Law and who is teaching a course this
summer in Ireland on Comparative Domestic Violence Law in
the United States, Ireland, India and South Africa. Not only are
there law school casebooks now, one of which Clare Dalton and I
just published,101 but there are courses on comparative domestic
violence. Judi just left to teach this course in Ireland for two
weeks, and we talked before she left. She observed that all four
99

Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women, Feminist Lawmaking, and
International Human Rights, NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming).
100
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (“CEDAW”), adopted in 1979 and otherwise known as the
international bill of rights for women, is an international human rights treaty
reaffirming and defining equal rights between men and women in all respects
and specifically with respect to sex, political and public life, education,
employment, health, marriage, and law. See United Nations General
Assembly, The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (Dec. 18, 1979), available at gopher://gopher.un.org/
00/ga/cedaw/convention.
101
CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN
AND THE LAW (Foundation Press 2001). See also BEVERLY BALOS & MARY L.
FELLOWS, LAW AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (Carolina Academic Press
1994 & Supp. 2000); NANCY K.D. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LAW (West
Publ’g Co. 2000).
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countries rely on protective orders and criminalization remedies
despite the diversity of contexts and explanations of domestic
violence in each country. I do not know whether that just reflects
the primacy of American frameworks in other countries or even
whether it is true, but I think it is an interesting observation.
Renée’s comments and Betsy’s responses regarding the
greater social-welfare context, for example, of the Netherlands
and the U.K., suggest the significance of cultural specificity.102
Of course, there is always cultural specificity, and it is important
to recognize this and integrate it into our analysis. Betsy did not
mention this, but the history of the battered women’s movement
in the U.K., for example, has historically been a more explicitly
political and activist movement than what has developed in the
United States.103
Renée Römkens
Very briefly, I think part of the answer to the question of
differences in Western Europe is CEDAW (the Convention of the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).104
CEDAW is a treaty by the U.N. in 1979. Various countries use
the international human rights perspective more and more as a
framework to say what they are doing and whether they are
complying with this document. The focus of CEDAW, however,
is clearly on legislation, so it has a unifying influence
internationally.
Liz Schneider
As I discuss in the book, CEDAW and other international
human rights documents see violence as linked to other aspects of
women’s lives in ways that I think are very important.

102
103

See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71 (describing the battered women’s movement in the

U.K.).
104

See supra note 100.
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Sally Merry
Can I just intervene quickly? The thing about CEDAW is that
it is not just about legislation; it is also about substantive
equality. It is about media, ritual, and the spread of cultural
stereotypes, education, and jobs. It actually has a very broad
structural analysis about gender and equality. So I think it is
really more about social transformation than just about
legislation.
Liz Schneider
CEDAW raises the question of the implications of
international human rights. This is an area where there is a lot of
activism and writing. Many people are doing activist work
around the world and bringing knowledge and experience home
regarding the difference an international human rights framework
makes.
On the mandatory arrest issue, I am sympathetic with the
concerns that Renée raises.105 I think that it is not surprising that
the Supreme Court struck down the civil rights remedy of
VAWA,106 which was the non-criminal aspect. There are other
sections of the Violence Against Women Act that still stand—
renewed money for shelters and other things that are being used
in an affirmative way.107 There is no question in my mind that the
105

See supra text accompanying notes 52-68.
See supra note 64 (discussing Violence Against Women Act).
107
Congress views violence against women as a national problem and has
resolved to continue to fund Violence Against Women Act programs, to which
it appropriated close to $1,800,000,000 from 1995 to 2000. H.R. Con. Res.
290, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted). On October 28, 2000, President Clinton
signed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000), which strengthened and expanded VAWA
programs and authorized funding. Press Release, White House (Oct. 28, 2000)
(LEXIS, News Library, U.S. Newswire file); see also Jan Erickson,
Legislative Update, NAT’L NOW TIMES (Winter 2001), at http://www.
now.org/nnt/winter-2001/legupdate.html. Congress passed a bill appropriating
over $400,000,000 to VAWA programs for the fiscal year ending September
2001 and enacted Violence Against Women Act of 2000, which reauthorized
106
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federal VAWA programs. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464, Division B
(2000); S. 2787, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. Res. 4690, 106th Cong. (2000).
Nevertheless, fiscal year appropriations for the year 2001 fell $200,000,000
short of authorized levels. Testimony Criminal Charges for Harm to a Fetus:
Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm., Constitution Subcomm., 106th
Cong. (2001) (statement of Juley Fulcher, Public Policy Director, National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence); Editorial, Fetus Bill a Devious Way to
Attack Abortion Rights, ATL. J. & CONST., May 4, 2001, at 20A. The
proposed 2002 budget increases VAWA funding by more than 35% from
2001. Testimony of the Commerce, Justice, State & Judiciary Subcomm. of the
House Appropriations Comm. Appropriations for the Justice Dep’t, 106th
Cong. (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Attorney General, United States).
Despite this substantial 2002 budget increase, it still falls over $100
million short of congressional authorized funding levels for VAWA. Jan
Erickson, Legislative Update: Bush and Congress Reach Out to Rich White
Guys, NAT’L NOW TIMES, Summer 2001, available at http://www.now.org/
nnt/summer-2001/legupdate.html. This shortfall includes approximately half
the authorized VAWA budget for rape prevention and education programs and
less than authorized funding for battered women’s shelters. David M. Heger,
Violence Against Women Policy Trends Report 19, NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN PREVENTION RESEARCH CENTER, July 5, 2001, at
http://www.vawprevention.org/policy/trends/trends19.shtml. Additionally, the
budget continues to provide no funding to a transitional housing program for
victims despite a National Coalition Against Domestic Violence survey
indicating that such a program is priority for domestic violence service
providers. Id. However, the Bush Administration announced in April 2001
that it would request from Congress the additional funding of $102.5 million
authorized for VAWA. Erickson, supra. In April 2001, the Senate proposed
that the month of April be designated as National Sexual Assault Awareness
Month, encouraging efforts to eliminate sexual violence and provide justice to
sexual assault victims. S. Res. 72, 107th Cong. (2001). The House introduced
the Victim’s Economic Security and Safety Act in July 2001 providing
workplace protections for domestic and sexual assault victims requiring time
off for physical or emotional health care and legal assistance. H.R. 2670,
107th Cong. (2001). The House, Senate, or President has not acted on either
of these bills. More recently, the Bush Administration received criticism from
women’s organizations alleging that his nominees for United States Attorney
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals are not capable of enforcing VAWA.
See Audrey Hudson, 2nd Judicial Nominee Hit in Senate; Democrats Criticize
Smith, GOP Cries Foul Over Pattern, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at 1
(noting that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals nominee openly criticized
VAWA on federalism grounds); Janet McConnaughey, NOW Says President’s
Nominee “Inappropriate” for U.S. Attorney, BATON ROUGE STATE
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privatization Mimi discussed is something that we will see only
get worse. I would argue that the decontextualization of the
broader gender framework in domestic violence that I discuss in
the book is an example of this re-privatization, in a most
problematic sense.
It is also fascinating to me that some of you read this book as
so optimistic. I see the book as much more textured, describing a
glass half full but also half empty. Indeed, in the book I try to
struggle with what I think are some of the real limitations of law,
which I now see more clearly than when I began this work. For
example, many of us who began this work thirty years ago
thought that getting expert testimony in on battering was going to
change the rules of the game. We may not have fully appreciated
the tenacity of law to reverse those insights—the way that law is
one step forward and three steps backward. That is very much
my own view in the book. So it is very interesting to me that it is
read more optimistically by several of you. Maybe that is just the
difference between the mind of the author and the minds of
readers. This is the very reason that it is wonderful and valuable
to have this kind of conversation.
So with that, again, thanks.
Christine Harrington
I, too, take exception to the view that Liz’s book is simply
“optimistic.” In fact, I think that her theoretical analysis puts to
rest this naï vete about law. There may be a tendency among
lawyers to look for a fix, and if the fix does not cure the
problem, they are viewed as “pessimistic”; if the fix does, they
are called “optimistic.” This pessimist/optimist analysis, I think,
belies the theoretically informed dimensions of this book. If there
is something that is optimistic for me in reading the book, it is
Liz’s continual development of the social relations and human
conditions, which place people in positions of struggling for
emancipation. This comes through in her own voice as author, in
her description of her own life as a younger person at the
TIMES/MORNING ADVOCATE, Feb. 2, 2002, at 6B.
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beginning of her movement experience all the way to today. It is
this spirit we so often put into our imagined world of feminist
lawmaking that gives us an angle, or standpoint, for
comprehending the dialectic of rights and politics from a feminist
perspective. I take exception to the optimist/pessimist debate
because I do not find it fruitful in understanding the praxis.
Are there comments or questions from the audience?
Elizabeth Rapaport
I would like to ask Renée to amplify what she means by “the
social category,”108 and by her critique that the social category
offers a better alternative to legal strategies. Renée argues that
European social democracies have adopted strategies of
addressing feminist issues that are preferable to the legal
strategies American feminists have adopted. I am not sure that I
understand why there is an opposition or wherein it lies.
There was a time in the early history of Second Wave
Feminism in the United States when many of us thought that
classical socialism contained sufficient understanding of the
“Woman Question,” when we believed that social reform
embracing equality for women would more or less automatically
achieve feminist goals.109 This classical socialist view might be a
version of “the social category.” As Friedrich Engels often told
working class and socialist audiences about the socialist future:
when the first free man meets the first free woman, transformed
social relations between the sexes would begin to appear in the
new world of freedom and equality.110 Our movement revealed
that issues of power and ideology are much stickier and more
108

See supra notes 11, 24-28, 55, 67, 97-98 and accompanying text
(referring to the shift in classifying battered women as a social category in the
1970s to a legal category in the 1990s).
109
For recent discussions of Second Wave Feminism, see generally DEAR
SISTERS (Rosalyn Baxandall & Linda Gordon eds., Basic Books 2000); THE
FEMINIST MEMOIR PROJECT (Rachel Blau DuPlessis & Ann Snitow eds.,
Three Rivers Press 1998).
110
See FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE
PROPERTY, AND THE STATE (Int’l Publishers Co. Aug. 1995).
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recalcitrant than we had initially understood. Renée, do you
disagree with this reading of the history of the women’s
movement in the United States or draw other lessons from
European experience? Do you see the solution to problems of
domestic violence as lying solely in a decent public commitment
of resources to people in trouble, and the treatment of abusers
and abused within the family in accordance with a pathologizing,
medical model? What is the social category? For me it is an
interesting and provocative notion, but raises the uneasy feeling
that it ignores crucial lessons of our movement.
Renée Römkens
My intent when I made the dichotomy—and of course every
dichotomy does not give a full spectrum of the facts—was to use
a provocative hypothesis about the dichotomy between social and
legal categories to highlight a tendency that I see in the U.S., in
this case domestic violence—how a social problem becomes the
subject of legalization that may exclude other political strategies.
What are we doing as feminists, as people who are committed to
social justice, when law seems to become a central strategy to
achieve change? What kind of strategies do we look for? I
certainly do not mean to use the social category to refer to
battering as a medical or psychological issue, nor do I use it as a
normative category in the sense that it implies or describes a
certain approach or strategy that would necessarily be better or
more effective. It is a descriptive distinction at this point to
highlight what I consider to be a difference in the way law
operates on a social and cultural level in the U.S. and in
Europe,111 and the kinds of foci that are subsequently created in
political strategies.

111

See supra notes 61-62, 71-73 and accompanying text
approach of the American battered women’s movement to
activists in Western Europe, who have developed a method
more equal balance between the legal and social strategies
battered women).
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Isabel Marcus
I want to raise the question of going beyond caselaw and
legislation. Most countries have some form of legislation that
deals with the question of defining injury and the appropriate
court’s jurisdiction, and I don’t think that the existence of a
statute is the issue. Rather the focus should be on how law,
lawyers and people hold public officials accountable. In one
sense law has very limited ways to achieve accountability. In the
United States, there are class action lawsuits and endless
litigation, but law is a rough though necessary framework for
accountability. Within bureaucracies, accountability is a much
more complicated issue; the sledgehammer of the law does not
achieve accountability. For example, in Eastern Europe there is
no notion of suing the police for violations of civil rights,
including for failure to protect battered women if prosecutorial
discretion is abused.112 If judges pressure parties to settle cases by
asking whether a battered woman forgives the perpetrator, or if
doctors will not give a medical certificate, a gate-keeping device
to allow the woman to file a lawsuit or a complaint with the
police, separate criminal code provisions will be mere law on the
books. It seems to me that as one starts thinking about
accountability, the grass roots activism occurring in many
countries is not about rewriting the law. Rather, it is a search for
institutional and cultural mechanisms and transformations for
developing accountability.
Christine Harrington
That calls for greater public transparency and is more
112

See Christian Boulanger, Constitutionalism in East Central Europe?
The Case of Slovakia Under Merciar, 33 EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY 21
(Mar. 1999); Virginie Guiraudon, Third Country Nationals and European
Law: Obstacles to Rights’ Expansion, 24 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUDIES
657 (Oct. 1998); Meltem Muftuler-Bac, The Impact of the European Union on
Turkish Politics, 34 EAST EUROPEAN QUARTERLY 159 (June 2000) (explaining
that the law on prosecuting public officials is a major obstacle to the trial and
punishment of public officials for human rights violations).

SCHNEIDERMACRO 7-11FINALWINTRO.DOC

368

7/24/02 1:18 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

complex than the simple question of how privacy is situated as a
value for Justice Scalia. New legal mechanisms or accountability
for violent behaviors can be enacted. Liz’s involvement in
writing an amicus brief in support of Hedda Nussbaum, who sued
Joel Steinberg for tort damages,113 provides one example of this.
Liz argued against civil assault statutes of limitation laws to
enable battered women to exercise a legal right to sue in a civil
context.114 I also think Isabel’s points are quite good in terms of
showing the life of law and the continuing, unfolding dimensions
of law. This perspective gives a richer analysis of state power
and NGOs and these other factors.
Renée Römkens
You emphasize, Chris, the need for recognition of the
importance of options other than law. And I find very interesting,
for example, what has been happening in Australia, where
activists are looking for alternative remedies that are more about
developing social structures to hold agencies accountable.115
Audience Member

113

Nussbaum v. Steinberg, 703 A.D.2d 32 (N.Y. 2000).
See SCHNEIDER supra, note 1, at 94, 181-82.
115
In Australia, a report entitled Key Directions in Women’s Safety—A
Co-ordinated Approach to Reducing Violence Against Women was released on
February 8, 2002 by the Office of Women’s Policy recognized the need for a
specific strategy to address violence against women. See Family Violence:
Victorian Update, at http://www.dvirc.org.au/resources/DVUpdateVictoria.
htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2002). It proposed to focus government efforts in
four key areas to reduce violence against women: (1) protection and justice
(focusing on reform of the criminal justice system and police response), (2)
options for women (including strategies to allow women to remain in the home
rather than fleeing), (3) prevention of violence (including early intervention
programs targeting young men), (4) community action and coordination
(including a move toward an integrated response for family violence based on
the “Duluth Model,” which incorporates the criminal justice system, programs
for victims, perpetrators and other services. See Domestic Abuse Intervention
Project, at http//www.Duluth-model.org/daipmain.htm (last visited Apr. 21,
2002).
114
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I am from Turkey. One thing that you brought up is human
rights texts and other texts like CEDAW. I do not think it is right
to imply a lack of creativity on the part of people in other
countries—for not enough people care about human rights. Even
if people do care, many issues exist that have to be addressed. In
discussing the private/public issue you first address privacy from
a social aspect. And then you address privacy in terms of
economics, for example the privatization of social securities. I
guess there is a benefit in this.
In Turkey, we have virginity exams.116 In the first sense of
privacy, we cannot get rid of them. Constitutionally we are
entitled to some level of privacy, but is privacy good for us? We
cannot just turn it into gender equality. So the argument against
privatization falls under one of economics. We are for privacy,
however, because we do not want vaginal exams. In that sense,
there is a certain use for privacy. I am not willing to give it up. It
depends upon the particular cultural and political context.
Liz Schneider
I agree. One thing I want to clarify, because it is important
that it not be misunderstood, is that in the book, I also discuss
some of the ways in which it is important to think affirmatively
116

In Turkey, as in other societies, women are expected to be virgins
until marriage, and those accused of not being virgins must consent to
virginity exams under tremendous family and police pressures. REGAN RALPH,
A MATTER OF POWER: STATE CONTROL OF WOMEN’S VIRGINITY IN TURKEY 6
(Human Rights Watch 1994). If rumors suggest a young woman is not a
virgin, her family will often bring her to a state or private physician to
establish either that her hymen is intact, or, if not, that it was damaged in an
accident and not broken through sexual activity. Id.
In 1999, the government banned virginity testing of female students, but
in 2001, Turkey’s conservative health minister introduced regulations
permitting principals in state schools that train nurses, midwives, and other
health workers to expel girls who are not virgins. Susan Fraser, Virginity Tests
Spark Outrage: Turkish Teens in Nurse School Must Submit, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, July 19, 2001, at 5C. Once again, however, the practice has been
halted. Turkey Rescinds Law on Virginity, RECORD, Feb. 28, 2002, at A8.
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about privacy.117 Privacy is not just this terrible thing for battered
women; it is important that privacy can also offer safety,
integrity, and autonomy for women generally, as well as women
who are battered. Many legal issues and many political questions
have merged around these issues of privacy. Some examples
include confidentiality of battered women’s names and addresses,
privacy regarding the forwarding of mail, confidentiality and
privacy regarding shelters and conversations with battered
woman counselors. Thus, there are many contexts in which
privacy for battered women is important and should be
understood in that affirmative way.
None of this is simple. Sally’s first point—that the definition
of the problem is so central—is the reason I start with the
definition of the problem in the book. Other points that have not
been mentioned in the conversation are the incredible difficulties
in integrating and absorbing the lessons of the feminist arguments
around domestic violence over a long period of time, the
tremendous struggles judges face to do the job that they need to
do, and the immense challenge to train lawyers to listen to the
problems of battered women and not immediately move into a
pathological perspective. I have been teaching specialized courses
on domestic violence in law schools for ten years and have been
training lawyers for many years on issues of domestic violence.
Even lawyers who are incredibly thoughtful and sophisticated and
who have done really good work have to engage in a continual
process of self-reflection and self-criticism. This book is written
in that spirit. I do not say this is the end of the conversation about
our accomplishments and mistakes, but that a process of ongoing
self-criticism and reflection is part of what it means to do this
work. One constantly has to examine the new forms and
manifestations of subversion, whether it is privatization or the
ways in which—and I am sure Sally would agree—even the
international human rights framework can be turned into its own
contradiction. It is really about this as a long haul struggle, a
long-term process of having to think and evaluate and rethink.
Having said that, I do want to go back to the issue that Renée
117

See SCHNEIDER, supra note 1, at 89-90.
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raised about feminist lawmaking. The term “feminist lawmaking”
is intended to be descriptive, not normative. Feminist legal
advocates have helped develop new legal harms where they did
not exist before. The law would not recognize sexual
harassment118 or domestic violence as a harm if not for feminist
lawmaking. Has that meant victory or even linear progress? Not
at all! It has meant new struggles, new problems, new directions,
and new twists in the road. But to not recognize that there has
been something that has changed is, I think, not to really
acknowledge the power and importance of feminist legal work
over the last thirty years. We have not done enough, but we have
made some incredibly important inroads. Law is not enough, but
it is a start, and it can be very meaningful to many women on the
ground.
Audience Member
What are those lessons you mention? And what about looking
toward the future and seeing what coordination is being done
within the feminist movement or movements?
Liz Schneider
Well, I think it is a worldwide movement now. There is an
extraordinary amount of important work being done everywhere
on these issues.119 The lessons involve recognizing the impact of

118

See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 106 S. Ct. 2399 (1986).
See supra notes 21-22, 26-30, 40-42, 51, 61-62, 70-73 (discussing the
international battered women’s movements). See also supra note 100 and
accompanying text (discussing the United Nations’ Convention on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”)). See generally
Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and
Future Developments in International Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 607 (1997)
(chronicling the evolution of the international movement to combat violence
against women); Stacy R. Sandusky, Women’s Political Participation in
Developing and Democratizing Countries: Focus on Zimbabwe, 5 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 253, 270-80 (discussing women’s movements in Uganda,
Tanzania, Kenya, Namibia and South Africa).
119
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feminist legal advocacy around the world in transforming our
understandings, and yet recognizing that that work has to be done
in a self-critical way, that it has to be subject to, in a sense, the
dialectics of practice, of seeing what works, of going back to
theory, and going back to practice. Finally, the lessons show that
this is really a long and slow process.
Audience Member
Is the book based on an American model?120

Liz Schneider
It certainly focuses largely on that American experience, but
it does not suggest that the American experience can or should be
imported to other countries or cultures. I have done some work
on violence in other parts of the world like South Africa and
China. I think it is important to link this process in the U.S. with
others around the world and to see the resonances and differences
in other places. It would be wonderful if similar reflection and
evaluation were done in other parts of the world and in other
culturally-specific contexts to consider the victories, obstacles
and lessons that we have to learn to do better work for women
who are battered and link violence to women’s equality.
Christine Harrington
Thank you all, both panelists and audience members, so much
for your participation in this stimulating conversation.

120

See supra notes 28 (discussing the legal rights and legislative approach
to domestic violence that is used in the United States), 64 (discussing how
VAWA functions) and accompanying text.

